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PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY IN AQUARIUS
LEONARD V. KAPLAN*
INTRODUCTION
T HE rhetoric of alienation and powerlessness, to the extent it
embodies the reality of the world, poses a threat to the Rule
of Law in a democratic society.' This is how it should be. A
prime function of the law is to give substance to the ideals of the
society it rules and to make those ideals real (put them at least
in operation to the degree that the society feels the possibility of
their future operation).
With these assumptions I intend to examine the institution
of criminal law as it operates in our alienated society; I will
focus on our justification of punishment and the role of psychia-
try in the criminal process. Such role, I will argue, poses a poten-
tial and dangerous distortion of our rehabilitative ideal. The
literature in the area is increasingly large, reflecting not mere
scholarly fashion 2 but an anxiety that something is wrong with
the operation of our criminal law institutions. It is peculiarly
easy to immerse oneself in an examination of the minutiae of crim-
inal practice, losing sight of the total institution, thereby lessen-
ing anxiety. This article will examine the practice of punishment
philosophically, hopefully without losing sight of the ramifica-
tions of the particular actual or suggested practice.
For the purpose of this examination I intend to reflect
upon two recently proffered conceptual models of the criminal
law, one by Professor Packer 3 and the other by Professor
0 Presently in Ph.D. program, Clinical Psychology, University of Chicago. A.B.,
Temple University, 1962; J.D., Temple University, 1965; LL.M., Yale University, 1966.
1. I differentiate between alienation and powerlessness in that "alienation" as I am
using it can refer to a group or groups who feel removed from, unrepresented by, and/or
committed against the society. These groups are potentially powerful.
2. A. Kojeve suggests that the role of the intellectual as contrasted with that of the
philosopher is to analyze both the real world (of everyday life) and philosophical world
and is to provide a bridge between the two, suggesting the means whereby the ruler can
operationalize the best of philosophy. We lawyers are allegedly particularly trained for this
endeavor. A. KOJEvw, TYRANNY AND WISDOM, ON TYRANNY (1963).
3. H. PAcEER, THE LiMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968). The particular models
were advanced previously in a seminal article, Packer, Two Models of the Criminal
Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1964). I find that for the most part I am in agreement
with Packer. Admitting agreement, I also admit real frustration concerning Packer's con-
clusions and an inability to proceed any further than did he. I think this is because of an
error in focus. Modern lawyers are trained to think legal institutions can structure social
consciousness; too often the reverse is the case.
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Katz. 4 Next, I will examine the several philosophic justifications
for punishment and consider the extent to which the practice of
punishment and the criminal process in general can handle recent
"cause" situations in this country: 1) The Chicago Democratic
Convention, 2) The Chicago Conspiracy Trial, 3) The Chicago-
based actions of the Weathermen. I intend to describe and specu-
late on the dynamics of these situations. I will assert that the insti-
tution of punishment cannot cope with these situations (nor can
implicitly the criminal law as a whole). Yet, I do not stand for the
abolition of punishment. Finally, I will examine our understand-
ing of the doctrine of responsibility. This treatment will be made
with an eye to developing in a follow-up article what modifica-
tions, if any, can be made to bridge the widening breach between
the rule of law and the actions of the despondent and "anti-legal
alienated."
I.
Professor Katz, following James MarshalF and Lady Barbara
Wooton, 6 posits a "revised" version of the criminal process in lieu
of the "normal version" (our present system). This revised ver-
sion, as I understand it, 7 in contrast to the retrospective normal
version, i.e., where there is a concentration on the intent of the
individual at the time of commission of the act as a necessary
element of guilt, is "futuristic," presenting a bifurcated process.
Its first inquiry would seek to establish the commission of the
criminal act; its second, should such be necessary, would provide
an assessment of the offender for purposes of sentencing--a sen-
tencing, I take it, functionally different from punishment as we
now call it. This sentencing will be a tailored treatment process
definitely fitting into a rehabilitative ideal. In Katz' words:
An explicitly futuristic system-what I shall call the revised version-
would eliminate the notion of mens rea from the definition of crim-
inality. Revised version criminality would include only an enumeration
4. Katz, Dangerousness: A Theoretical Reconstruction of the Criminal Law, 19
BurrALO L. REv. 1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Katz]. This article is one of two parts, the
second of which I await. I was challenged by the first article although I disagree with its
conclusions. A theoretical article can do little more than challenge on the academic level;
it can on the real-world level prompt or indicate a move toward change; hence this reply.
5. J. MARSHALL, INTENTION IN LAW & SocIEry (1968).
6. B3. WOOTON, CRIME AND CRIMINAL LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A MAGISTRATE AND SOCIAL
ScmNc (1963).
7. Professor Katz' article is excellent and tightly written, in some respects so tightly
that I am uncertain that I understand him. I apologize for any misinterpretation.
PUNISHMENT
of datum-conduct which is considered dangerous in the legislative
sense. As a matter of process, the initial inquiry would ascertain only
whether a given defendant was historically involved in the datum-
conduct in question. If the given defendant is found to have been
historically involved in the datum-conduct, then a further proceed-
ing would be necessary to determine the sense in which and the extent
to which the particular defendant is dangerous. In this proceeding all
information which is relevant to the task of assessing the character
problems of the defendant and the probability of his engaging in
future dangerous behavior would be considered. In this way the essen-
tial task of arriving at the best mode of disposition can be performed
unclouded by rules of evidence and problems of testimonial com-
petence which are designed to serve other purposes.8
I found myself agreeing with Professor Katz as he urgently
attacked and dismembered our "normal" process revealing its
obvious inefficiency and, of more import, injustice to the particu-
lar offender.
Under the normal version, punishment is justified for a
myriad of reasonsY But, indicates Katz, there exists no justifica-
tion for rendering pain or suffering by way of the practice of
punishment to an individual whose "behavior is not crucially
affected by the potential infliction of pain in the future."'10 Nor,
he further indicates, is such a justification attempted." He
attacks the modern explanation of punishment: "punishment for
crime makes 'more vivid' the seriousness with which society
regards the underlying norms. . . . Punishment is thus a tool
of socialization.' 1 2 Katz asserts that the justification is weak-
ened through two errors, one of conception and the other of ex-
ecution. One cannot make group values more vivid where the
individual does not feel part of the group. Punishment to such
individuals, the argument goes, can only further isolate the in-
dividual, not pull him into the common fold. On the execution
(or operational) level the argument clearly shows "punishment
almost exclusively takes the form of exclusion and isolation."'3
8. See Katz at 10-11. I would suggest these "other purposes" functionally include
or at least should include protection for the offender against errant, irresponsible or good
faith, but wrong, hearsay.
9. The classic philosophical justifications rest on utilitarian or retributive grounds.
See Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 1955 PHrLOSOPHIC'REV. 64.
10. See Katz at 17.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 18.
13. Id.
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With appropriate citation," Katz shows that our present
mode of operationalizing punishment is not psychologically
sound and is, if I read his position correctly, unjust. "One can
hardly avoid concluding that on its own terms the normal version
is immoral."' 5
Why is the normal version so patently immoral? The answer
rests with the two underlying presuppositions of the normal ver-
sion's justification of punishment: 1) men are not fungible but
individuals in themselves, and 2) men who are not in control
should not be punished and certainly not be used as examples
to deter others.' 6 The asserted immorality lies in the failure of
the normal version "to see that if punishment is necessary for the
socialization of specific norms, where socialization to these norms
has nevertheless failed one can hardly impose blame. Yet the nor-
mal version inflicts punishment on such individuals to aid the
socialization of others."' 7
I heartily join Professor Katz in inveighing against a society
which blames those it has conditioned to be anti-social for being
14. E.g., E. ERICKSON, IDENTITY, YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968); J. PIAGET, THE MORAL
JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1965); he could have added E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961). The
supportive list is potentially endless. Although I agree fully with the validity of Katz'
psychological assertions, note that a sophist or modem psychiatrist, social worker, or penol-
ogist could dialectically manipulate Katz' argument by asserting that isolation is the one
method whereby we can alter and restructure, i~e., normalize, the personality of the
offender. In popular parlance "brainwashing" is a most effective mode of personality
alteration. But, hopefully, we experience means-ends problems. No matter how effective
and "good" the end result, we think certain procedures in and of themselves are inhuman.
15. See Katz at 20. Can anything immoral be just? The reason for raising this issue
of justice is obvious and not merely linguistic sophistry. As lawyers we are interested
certainly in justice. On its own terms the modem system of punishment would aspire to
be "just" as a practice and "just" on the individual level. It may occur that a practice
is in itself "just," but in an individual case unjust. Certainly, in "normal" terms the
punishment of the innocent (if this is possible logically) is manifestly unjust. See, e.g.,
Quinton, On Punishment, 14 ANALYSIS 1933-1942, in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY: READ-
INGS IN PHILOSOPHY AND LAw (H. Morris ed. 1961). (Quinton argues that the word punish.
ment logically connotes that the offender is not innocent).
16. Our modem doctrine of mens rea, as well as our insanity defense, is conditioned
on this second point. Perhaps this should be somewhat qualified. H.L.A. Hart, whose
works on punishment and responsibility represent contemporary legal classics, indicates
that same would claim that besides the elements of knowledge of circumstances and fore-
sight of consequences, in terms of which many define mens rea, there is another "mental"
or at least psychological element which is required for responsibility: the accused's "con-
duct" must be voluntary and not involuntary. This element in responsibility is more
fundamental than mens Tea in the sense of knowledge of circumstances or foresight of
consequences; for even where mens Tea in that sense is not required and responsibility is
"strict" or "absolute" (as it is said to be, e.g., in the case of dangerous driving), this ele-
ment, according to some modem writers, is still required. H.L.A. HART, PUNIS1I1ENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 90 (1968).
17. See Katz at 20.
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anti-social. I also deny the efficacy and berate the injustice of our
typical modes of punishment. "Enforced solidarity, outcast status
as a punishment for crimes, and other forms of exile [stigma-
tization in and by the dominant society?], can do nothing but
aggravate the problem."' 8 But it does not require a change from
the normal to the "revised," that is, the behavioristic version,
to change our mode of operationalizing punishment.19 We must
ask if Katz is correct in emphasizing his attack on the deterrence
rationale upon which he claims the normal version is based. It
would seem to me that an individual, a man in himself, may have
indeed been socialized, may accept the values of the dominant
culture, may, indeed, know and understand the sanction for a par-
ticular proscribed act and, nonetheless, purposely breach the
criminal law for "moral" reasons (civil disobedience), for "im-
moral" reasons (economic gain, namely, white collar crime or
organized crime), or out of strong emotion (anger or fear,
namely, homicide of wife's lover). Undoubtedly, a man may be
socialized and sometimes breach; most of us do.
But Professor Katz is referring to another class, to those who
trtily are not socialized and who cannot control themselves. This
class may encompass at least two classes of individuals. An individ-
ual may be unsocialized, in that he is committed to other than
the legalized norms of the society but still is acquainted with these
norms and capable of following them if he so desires.20 The class
18. Id.
19. An eminent contemporary philosopher, Joel Feinberg, writes to this issue:
I think that most humanitarian reformers who claim that punishment is obsolete (or
immoral?) do not really mean what they say. They really mean that many of the
usual accompaniments of punishment,-spite, cruelty, pointless moralizing, and so on-
are obsolete, and in this I think they are right. Restriction of an offender's liberty is,
generally speaking, an injury to him. Most modem penal reformers do not wish to
eliminate this injury; they wish instead simply not to add insult to it. They recom-
mend taking advantage of a prisoner's confinement by making every possible effort to
rehabilitate him; but this would be a supplement to legal punishment, not a substitute
for it.
Feinberg, On Justifying Legal Punishment, Nomos III: RspoNsmsLrrY 152, 164, 165 (C. J.
Freidrich ed. 1960). Irrespective of Professor Katz' position, we can change our method
of punishment without changing the normal version.
20. I would like here to avoid problems of freewill and determinism. I do not see
them as necessary to this point of the discussion. One could argue as does Paul Edwards,
that "you are right . . . in maintaining that some of our actions are caused by our desires
and choices. But you do not pursue the subject far enough. You arbitrarily stop at the
desires and solutions. We must not stop there. We must go on to ask where they came
from; and if determinism is true there can be no doubt about the answer to this question.
Ultimately our desires and our whole character are derived from our inherited equipment
and the environmental influences to which we were subjected at the beginning of our lives
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to whom Professor Katz refers, however, is composed of those
who are both unsocialized and not deterrable by the threat of
punishment (or by punishment itself, if they have already under-
gone this ritual). Professor Katz, I think, is quite right in assert-
ing that some individuals "are not marginal with respect to
pain,"'21 i.e., they are not intimidated by the threat of the pain of
punishment or they will not be deterred by the threat of future
pain.22 I agree with Professor Katz that if one accepts his formu-
lation of justification for punishment, it is unfair 23 to punish this
category of offenders. Very few, even classically, have contended
that punishment is good in itself. It is certainly not a good in-
trinsic to the group Professor Katz has indicated. Punishment
may, fortunately, turn out to work to their welfare. It will cer-
tainly provide an enforced opportunity for expiation, satisfying
those who feel this is a necessity for reform. 24 But this is hardly
a justification for punishment. Along with Professor Katz and so
many commentators who have bothered to put their view in
print, I wonder:
He asked a very simple question: Why, and by what right do some
people lock up, torment, exile, flog and kill others, while they are
themselves just like those they torment, flog and kill? And in answer
he got deliberations as to whether human beings had free-will or not;
whether or not signs of criminality could be detected by measuring
the skull; what part heredity played in crime; whether immorality
could be inherited; and what madness is, what degeneration is, and
what temperament is; how climate, food, ignorance, imitativeness,
It is clear that we had no hand in shaping either of these." Edwards, Hard and Soft
Determination, in DETERMINISMu AND FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF MODERN SCIENCE 104-13 (S.
Hook ed. 1958). A hard determinist could quote a number of eminent supporters. "Our
volitions and our desires," wrote Holback in Good Sense "are never in our power. You
think yourself free, because you do what you will, but are you free to will or not to will;
to desire or not to desire?" Id. 109. And Schopenhauer expressed the same thought in the
following epigram: "A man can surely do what he wills to do, but he cannot determine
what he will." Id.
21. See Katz at 17-18.
22. Id. Katz continues, "these responses to the classical defense of punishment are
well known, and I am more particularly interested in the modern explanation." Id. I take
it Professor Katz does not buy the so-called classic defenses, otherwise, he would indicate
his points here against the "normal" system are well countered. I will outline such de-
fenses which, are indeed, well known, but which are as applicable to the revised as to the
normal version.
23. See Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PHILOSOPHIC REy. 164 (1958).
24. This is not an outlandish position. In fact, it was the underlying psychological
insight of the Roman Catholic confessional according to a noted psychologist, 0. H.
Mowrer. See this theme developed in 0. MowRaE, THE CRISIS IN PSYCHIATRY AND RELIGION
(1961), and 0. MowER, TiE NEw GROuP THERAPY (1964).
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hypnotism, or passion affect crime; what society is, what its duties are
and so on . . . . but there was no answer on the chief point: 'By
what right do some people punish others?' 25
II.
What is wrong with the Katz revised version of the criminal
process? 2 I can only speculate on its effects. Yet I can speculate
consistently with certain values which our criminal process, as a
function of our mythical democratic ideals, posits. For this pur-
pose I turn to Professor Packer's heuristic Crime Control and
Due Process Models.2 7
Packer's models are intellectual constructs designed to show
the direction a criminal process can take and the tension radiated
by the values inhering in either direction. Packer's models are
designed to show the structures and pressures in our normal
process and to allow evaluation. Katz' model is designed to be put
in operation and would, once in operation, lean toward one or the
other of Packer's descriptive, dynamic model directions.
Since Packer's formulations are well-known, I will briefly in-
dicate that the Crime Control Model is geared to yield efficiency
in a system of wide application and limited resources. It presumes,
encourages, and is designed to structure a guilty plea in a swift
functional manner. This would necessitate the exclusion of all
"obstructionist" procedure. The Due Process Model is primarily
25. L. ToLsroy, RESURRECTION (V. Traill transl. 1961). In his excellent book THE
RATIONALE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT (1966), Professor Pincoffs has used this excerpt from
Tolstoy as a preface. Pincoffs' final answer to this question is a frustrated one and this
after long and diligent thought. "The short answer to Tolstoy's question: 'By what right
do some people punish others?' is that, needing a practice, we do not know any better one
than legal punishment." Id. at 136.
26. The effectiveness of this revised scheme is contingent upon coping with the prob-
lem of delineating in a viable, i.e., non-arbitrary way, "dangerousness." One can hardly
fault Katz for his attempt in this area or for his method in giving operation to that
attempt. One must, however, analyze whether, and how, it will work. The Katz paper is
an excellent delineation and development of the behavioral position. Also it provides easy
and concise access to all who would analyze this position. But I remain unconvinced by
Katz' differentiation between anxiety and fear, as a basis for determining societal danger-
ousness. In "common useage" the two seem very close; on the conceptual level there is
much dispute about causes and feelings of anxiety. See generally R. MAY, THE MEANING
OF ANXIETY (1950).
27. Packer, supra note 3. See also Blumberg, Book Review, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 790
(1969), Blumberg suggests that Packer's prediction of a shift toward the Due Process
Model is in error and that the Crime Control Model will take the upper hand. Both
Packer and Blumberg prefer the due process version. Professor Katz himself has reviewed
the Packer book, 117 U. PA. L. Rav. 640 (1969).
187
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concerned with the rights of the individual thereby involving
sometimes (its critics would maintain) involuted procedural nice-
ties. The essence of the Due Process Model is its concern with
"the primacy of the individual and the complementary concept of
limitation on official power. "28 To this end, advocates of crime
control indicate, criminal procedure is often unnecessarily cum-
bersome.
The limitation of official power inhering in the Due Process
formulation is a point of our ideology that is worth developing.
Increasing numbers of commentators and a significant number of
our liberal and academic communities have seemed to reflect an
animus against official power. It may be apocryphal but I have
heard attributed to the humanistic psychiatrist Victor Frankl that
"America is based on a paranoid's dream: life, liberty and the pur-
suit of happiness." I think it axiomatic that as a society our orienta-
tion has been wherever possible a circumscription of official in-
tervention at the potential cost of personal physical security.
It is my belief that the Katz proposal would prove in deroga-
tion of the Due Process direction.29 The rationale for substituting
the revised version is to guarantee or at least structure toward an
individuated justice. The process will purportedly have both eyes
on the defendant at bar; it will not be motivated theoretically by
any unarticulated desire or need to deter the conduct of others.
But the revised system must necessarily work at the enforce-
ment level through the same procedures extant for the normal
version. The defendant will be processed in the same manner as
he is now. Except in the very limited number of cases where a de-
fendant is found to have committed the proscribed act and also is
found not to be dangerous, he will be subject to a dispositional
sanction or treatment.
If we grant it to be unfair to penalize an individual who had
no control of his action or has been conditioned by some combina-
tion of personal and societal determinants toward the act in ques-
28. H. PACRER, THE LInTS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 165 (1968).
29. I see the Katz scheme as another step in what could turn into a therapeutic state.
The Due Process Model stands for both substance and procedure. See Kaplan, Civil Con-
mitment or As You Like It, 49 B.U.L. Rv. 14 (1968). See generally T. SzAsz, THE MYTH
OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961); T. SzAsz, LAW, LMERTY AND PSYCHIATRY (1963); T. SzAsz,
PSYCHIATRIC JusrCE (1965); R. LEIFER, IN THE NAME OF MENTAL HEALTH: THE SOCIAL
FUNCTION OF PSYCHIATRY (1969); Beaver, The "Mentally Ill" and the Law: Sisyphus and
Zeus, 1968 UTAH L REv. 1; Beaver, Book Review, 14 McGILL L.J. 756 (1968). See also
Kaplan, Book Review, 43 Tut- L. REv. 923 (1969).
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tion, is it not as unfair to force treat him as it is to punish him? In
fact, we are operating on him through coercive process through no
fault of his own (by definition)30
The advantage of the revised system in terms of individuated
justice is nugatory if one feels, as I do, that a forced treatment is
as much punishment and, for some, more, compared to a typical
penal sanction. Moreover, the revised system structures toward a
potential indeterminancy of treatment which may prove more
harsh to the defendant than a straight, normal sanction. To be sure
Professor Katz would limit such abuse. My point is that once
posited and in actual operation it will be highly tempting to hold
a defendant until he is cured, Professor Katz' theory notwith-
standing. Cure and dangerousness, I feel, will be quickly equated
by institutional psychiatric experts, particularly where they feel
potential pressure from public opinion for any injury inflicted by
a "too-quickly-released" defendant.
Factually, the very treatment based upon the same psychiatric
evaluation can be proffered through the normal system. This di-
rection is, in fact, readily seen in the operation of our present
process. I have no protest if Professor Katz or others can persuade
legislatures to provide a dispositional phase of process where the
problem of dangerousness can be clearly defined and determined,
but only if a defendant can opt out of such a process by choice.
But I would not agree to the dropping of the mens rea require-
ment as related to the incorporation of such a second phase. I see
mens rea despite its obscurity as an additional safeguard against
any societal intervention against an accused.
Professor Katz has focused upon mens rea as a key concep-
tual culprit responsible for the normal system operating against
a blameless, control-less defendant. Ironically mens rea is one of
the very concepts which demands a personalized trial for an ac-
cused. Did he intend to perform the proscribed act? Did he act
voluntarily? Did he have any excuses or defenses? I am suggesting
that a defendant can indicate states of consciousness, excuses and
30. Notice that we have assumed that such individuals have little or no control. We
have not attempted, nor has Katz, to determine where or when the individual's control
of self was vitiated or to what extent he was passive in such loss of control. What is the
justification for opting for a psychiatrist over a lawyer or philosopher for such evaluation?
Will the revised version's psychiatric expert determine this? Why not have such questions
phrased by a lawyer and allow a psychiatrist to attempt to answer them after he has
reiealed the philosophic substratum of his particular school of theory.
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defenses through a mens rea concept or analogue which are de-
signed to guarantee the very individuation Professor Katz is seek-
ing. If the normal version fails to individuate, the fault is not a
function of mens rea nor will it be corrected by a revised version
which may not even formulate concepts to shield a defendant.
Such process could easily yield to ad hoc determinations contingent
upon the fortuity of a psychiatric board dedicated to one view of
man as opposed to another or who may not have any theory at
all, e.g. behaviorists who are anti-theoretical and who do get results
through methodological interventions."'
III.
Professor Katz, it seems to me, has not worked out the disposi-
tional phase of his process. This is most probably forthcoming. I
certainly hope so for I am assuming that his analysis and obvious
acute sense of individuated justice will allay some of my fear,
namely, the abdication of criminal disposition to psychiatric ex-
perts which I see as a further erosion of principles of personal
responsibility to a psychiatric bureaucracy. The dispositional
phase of the revised process, with or probably without a judge
(what, if any, would be his function?), will perhaps be constituted
by some sort of medical (psychiatric) or psychological board which
will scientifically assess the defendant's "being." I am not sure to
what extent the diagnosis of this capacity must be related to the
specific breach. For example, if an individual comes into the dis-
positional step of the revised process on a simple assault 2 and the
diagnosis indicates a high degree of potential dangerousness for
future physical altercations of this type, do we hold him until
cured? How do we determine how dangerous he must appear to
be? Do we want psychiatrists, psychologists, and/or social workers
making these judgments? What social (not medical) guidelines do
we give them?
But one may protest: this problem does not render the re-
vised version nugatory; criteria can be developed. Maybe. What,
to continue my cases, if a bad-check writer turns out to be poten-
tially physically dangerous. Do we hold him until cured? Katz sug-
31. See generally T. AYLLON & N. AZRIN, THE TOKEN ECONOMY: A AMOTIVATIONAL
SYSTEM FOR THERAPY AND REHABILITATION (1968).
32. H.L.A. Hart uses this particular example in Changing Conceptions of Regponsi.
bility, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILrrY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 186, 206 (1968).
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gests that an offender may be found not dangerous and released
immediately or as soon as public clamor allows. If public clamor
is important then this process also treats the individual to the ex-
tent public clamor restricts his release. Again I am concerned with
the direction the revised model can take; academic limitation, I
predict, would yield quickly to popular clamor once a dangerous-
ness standard was established as conceptually determinative.
My basis for this feeling is tied to the change of focus from mens
rea to dangerousness-a change from volition to result, a change
from an individual ideal to one more protective of community
security.
But this may be too cryptic. Mens rea focuses particularly on
the intent of the action; its orientation is to ascertain what the de-
fendant consciously wanted to effect by his act. Dangerousness
would function in the same way, but it connotes a focus to protect
others from individual harmful action.
The very attempt to reconstruct intent serves an important
function. It forces a judge and/or jury to attempt to put them-
selves in defendant's position and to feel what he was feeling and
to see how or why he could have intended (been motivated) to act
as he did. A "dangerousness" focus even by psychiatrists reflects
more concern with "what happened" and "will it happen again"
than to how it happened.
Returning to my hypothetical checkwriter, one can argue he
had notice of the risks inhering in a revised process, that is, he
knew that if he were caught he could potentially be held for his
position on a dangerousness continuum and not for the particular
bad-check writing act. So if we assume a rational bad check writer,
he assumed a risk based on notice and lost. Moreover, since he is
determined to be dangerous, why not keep him until rendered
harmless?
The classical answer lay in our tariff system of sanction. No
matter how bad a man's intent we demand a nexus between that
intent and his act and hold him according to our determination
of the seriousness of the damage caused by his act. Hence attempts,
for example, are sanctioned to a much lesser degree than the ac-
complished act. There has been a societally-held value that the
mere attempt even if unsuccessful for fortuitous reasons (as op-
posed to psychically determined failure mechanism) still should
pay less than for harm done. This may be based on a policy to pro-
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tect the individual, even, the bad offender, from severe societal
sanction. This common law policy is unarticulated and without
logical derivation-it reflects lay morality.
Professor Katz' revised version marks and may be marked by
a change in society's position on this question. I am suggesting
that the behaviorial scheme as posited by Katz is itself a product of
a reading of social problems and an attempt at a rational answer
to perceived societal demands.
The direction of the "reform" may prove subject to greater
abuse of our currently held value preference for individual auton-
omy, than the version it seeks to replace.
The law is a powerful force in contributing to the structuring
of popular morality. To the extent that legal institutions focus
on dangerousness and not the results of an act, society may demand
even a greater excision of the dangerous from the societal corpus.
In other words, the change in the law as it percolates to the society
(without attempting to analyze that process) may create greater
demands upon its process to repress dangerousness. At a certain
point one can discern demand for the suppression of the dangerous
without waiting for the legally proscribed act. And the revised
machinery facilitates the operationalization of such a tendency.
IV.
The traditional raison d'etre for our mens rea requirements
are recognized by Professor Katz. Under the mens rea rationale,
the argument goes, the individual is put on notice of the type of
conduct proscribed and can gauge his actions accordingly. Further,
to punish (or treat, I may add) an individual who did not inten-
tionally breach such a proscription is unfair. "Anxiety levels" will
rise when individuals know that mistaken behavior can result in
the invocation of the criminal process against them. Hart gives an
excellent account of this so-called "pricing system." 33 Feinberg
phrases the argument thus:
Because the criminal law recognizes certain excusing conditions, I can
make my plans in perfect confidence that I will not by accident, blun-
der my way into prison [or into a hospital] and have my plans ruined.
In short, the law maximizes the effectiveness of my choices and
33. H.LA. Hart, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in DErERMINSM AND F u.E OM IN
THE AGE OF MODERN SCIENCE 117 (S.'Howe ed. 1961).
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decision, helps me anticipate the future and plan accordingly, dim-
inishes anxiety, and insecurity; and deters by threat private individuals-
who might otherwise cause me great damage. Furthermore, I think, a
case could easily.be made that the law could not yield these benefits
for me nearly so effectively without the system of punishment. Finally,
and most importantly, the advantages I have cited are advantages
shared alike, by all.34
But the truth of the matter may be otherwise. This offered
rationale for mens rea requirements is based on an "economic"
model. Economic models assume rationality. The thieves, rapists,
murderers, and the Thoreaus, Spocks, and Hoffmans who have be-
come ensnared or ensnare themselves in the criminal process may
be in no way affected by the notice implications of our mens rea
requirements. May not be. Llewellyn suggests that the average
citizen does not know the rule of law3" (and probably does not feel
a lack thereby). This citizen abides by the "folkways" of society
which are predicated on his peer group membership. He follows
the law because the law reflects the societal norms, not necessarily
vice versa. But Llewellyn admonishes:
Modern means of communication and of force-application have made
possible terrifically effective government which, over a couple of gen-
erations, can prove efficient to almost wholly remodel folkways and
even mores, on a mass scale. Indeed before Hitler and Soviet Russia,
and without moderi technology, sociologists should not have over-
looked the work of the Zulu Chaka and, to a somewhat -comparable
extent, of the Mongol Genghis.3 6
Also, and obviously, there exists a dialectical tension between
the societal norms and modes of conduct and the authoritative
legal mandates. The mens rea requirement reflects the fact that
society finds it unfair to label a criminal and to intervene, even
therapeutically, with one who has not intentionally and purposely
34. See Feinberg, supra note 19, at 162. Professor Katz in reading a prior draft of this
article rightly commented that "those who think this way, if they exist, never commit
crimes (or are marginal)." He asks "what about those who do not test reality in a rational
way?" My answer goes to the basic if erroneous assumption the law makes: men are
rational and can be controlled by reason. As a policy assumption it seems to me valid to
assume such potential for rationality as opposed to the converse. Moreover, the criminal
process is directed to all of us, not to an offender after he acts. Even under the Katz pro-
posal the man who has -acted illegally will be subject to coercive disposition. This being the
case I prefer our present formula.- .
85. K. LLEWaLuYs, JuRisPRuDENcE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1962).
36. Id. at 411 n.d.
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breached a criminal ukase. Excuses and intent requirements in the
law partially maintain, I would conjecture, individual assessments
on extra-legal everyday matters.
The criminal mens rea legal practice acts as a very real moral-
ity giving center, evaluating the proffered excuses of offenders to
see whether and to what degree they measure up to acceptable
standards. This is a fairly sophisticated and slowly developing
process. It is arguable, however, that case development in the "ex-
cuse/mens rea" area is dead. Perhaps it should be resurrected and
aired to the populace. To the disinterested populace? How? The
normal version faces the same issue: how does it become a vital
institution? By vital I mean more than functioning; I mean value
generating and justice actualizing. Vitalization of our institutions
is needed. Killing mens rea does not create life, does not create
moral debate (even in esoteric places like law reviews); it fore-
closes debate. Of course, as Norval Morris commented, concerning
the abolition of the insanity defense, such foreclosure may save
time, effort, and effectuate a canalizing of our resources to more
fruitful issues.37
Substitution of the revised version for the normal version will
create debate at the rehabilitative level: a significant area worthy
of analysis rather than pedestalized obedience. If individual re-
sponsibility on the psychiatric level is important, the abolition of
mens rea is not going to further this end. Instead of an attempt to
elucidate responsibility categories, we will attempt to clarify psy-
chiatric nosological categories which, though heuristic for treat-
ment purposes, are not relevant to a justification for holding an
offender. Of course we can operationalize the revised version by
introducing lawyers, philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists as
well as psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers at this phase
of the process. Instead of the backward looking "normal" process
with its mens rea requirements, we can have a forward looking
assessment of, of, . .. of what? Well, of what the particular of-
fender is all about and of why he did what he did. We will then
have to ascertain if he knew what he was doing, and if so, why he
still did it. The question of his intent in doing the act may be
necessary to determine for therapeutic purposes. What if we find
that the offender knew what he was doing, knew it was legally
37. Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 514 (1968).
Morris, to my understanding, is a firm advocate of the mens rea practice.
194
PUNISHMENT
proscribed, and still felt justified in doing *what he did; what if
our team (of 'whatever composition) agrees that in the particular
case he *as in their opinion justified, but that he is dangerous?8
By treating such an offender may we not discourage this type of
future conduct even though we find it morally justified in the par-
ticular case?39
Specifically, I am concerned here with the "political offender"
who will probably fill an increasing caseload in our criminal proc-
ess. He could be a Dr. Spock or a Thoreau. Under the normal
version such an individual can reason: I think this law (or govern-
mental action) is unjust; by breaching this law (or governmental
action) I will highlight my dissent (serve witness); my breach
will be further highlighted by the punishment I receive; I have a
right to this action and an obligation to endure the concomitant
punishment. Our hero, as often he is, under the revised version, if
I understand it correctly, will be found to have committed the
act; this will constitute guilt. He will then move to phase two
where he will be somehow "assessed" for dangerousness. Maybe he
really is dangerous: a true revolutionary in the footsteps of a
Washington or a Jefferson. I take it, then we cure him of this
deviance. This is the way to individuate justice? This is the way to
treat an individual with dignity? Enough rhetoric. Intuitively,'I
think the equation of capacity responsibility with a psychiatric
label set in terms of dangerousness is a denial of the dignity of a
man. I think it both an immoral and unjust practice and immoral
and unjust in the individual case.40
The revised version, to the extent it relies on psychiatric
nosology as opposed to legal categories of responsibility, can under-
mine an indivcidual's opportunity to justify his action. He may well,
38. E.g., an offender may be found to have acted in self-defense but to have a potent
tial for physical violence generally.
39. To be fair the normal version yields a similar result. However, its structure is"
more conducive to the explanation of conduct than would be the revised version, which
seemingly automatically imports psychiatric expertise and therefore psychiatric nomencla-
ture. ""
40. See Katz at 22. Professor Katz indicates that our present operation of justice
undermines this demand. This is often and perhaps generally the case. I do not see the
revised version remedying the present defect but rather buttressing an already invidious
tendency. See Berlin, Equality as an Ideal, 56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOcI "
(1955-1956), in F. OLAFSON, JUsTICE AND SOCIAL POLICY 128, 130 (1961), where Professor
Berlin states, "Equality is one of the oldest and deepest elements in liberal thought and is
neither more nor less 'natural' or 'rational' than any other constituent in them. Like all
human ends it cannot be defended or justified, for it is itself that which justifies other
acts-means taken toward its realization." Id. at 130.
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feel inhibited by psychiatric experts who he knows to be assessing
his statements not philosophically but toward potential treatment.
This focuses process on rehabilitation even before a finding that
an offender should be held. Psychiatrists are specifically trained to
treat, not to answer, philosophic questions. If an offender for ex-
ample contends that he acted in self-defense, in the normal process
he may or may not be believed by a jury. But he has had an oppor-
tunity to have his position judged on its merits. Indeed, an of-
fender should have a right to know why he is being dealt with; he
should have the right to explain, attack, excuse, or mitigate any of
the "hearsay" information going into the judicial computer assess-
ing his fate. A psychiatric expert in a revised version may judge
any argument in excuse or mitigation, not in terms of justification
but as indicative of the presence or absence of a disease entity
which may or may not be a part of the expert's theoretical under-
standing of dangerousness. To the extent he is acting as a psychia-
trist, the expert is acting in terms of medical intervention. He
may see a paranoid schizophrenic where a jury sees an individual
who has acted in self-defense.
My protest is that psychiatrists have not proven their worth
as philosophers; they often fail to see the philosophic underpin-
nings of their own theoretical position. By substituting psychiatric
labels for legal categories we establish the psychiatrist as philoso-
pher king. We endow him with an understanding of societal dy-
namics of which he is often unaware when compared for example
to a sociologist, cultural anthropologist, philosopher and even
lawyer. Moreover, the law still has the function of structuring to-
ward certain ideals. Psychiatric practice is often geared to struc-
ture man's conformity to existing standards. Psychiatric theory and
practice can be a powerful socializing force-but this force may
lead in the direction of other-directed conformity. The more the
law institutionalizes psychiatrists as decision-makers, the more the
tendency toward conceiving man in terms of disease entities. And
once a man is so labeled we have dynamically structured his abdi-
cation of responsibility. After all a sick man cannot be blamed; he
is sick, not evil, because our psychiatric priests so said. Men tend
to believe their doctors.4'
41. In another article I posited a model man, i.e., a post-Freudian man and placed
him in a technological, alienated society. I then attempted to use this description as
explanatory of and as a polemic against the practice of civil commitment. I still stand




We are in the process of forming an extensive literature con-
cerning this phase and perhaps the abolition of the mens rea re-
quirements.42 A significant literature concerned with the abolition
of the insanity defense has already been developed. 43 I think it in-
dicative of a disaffection with a prime traditional symbol in our
normal process. Abolition would affect relatively few cases as has
been often indicated. In fact, given the wide practice of guilty
pleas predicated on plea bargaining, the abolition of mens rea may
not affect large numbers of cases. But its effect in terms of reflecting
and forming public opinion is more difficult to assess. At the very
least the mens rea requirement provides an important buffer be-
tween the individual and the state where the individual offender
chooses to invoke the full process. I favor the maintenance of such
a buffer institution.
The debate over the abolition of the insanity defense high-
lights one particular issue key to either the normal or revised
process: the use of psychiatric expertise in the criminal process.
One assertion against the insanity defense is the spectre it presents
of two adversary scientists (psychiatrists) validating diametrically
opposed views. Psychiatric testimony at the trial level is often
predicated on a Procrustean bed to advance the particular adver-
dignity-a move toward a therapeutic welfare state where the concept of individual
autonomy and responsibility will be anthropological vestiges of an older unenlightened
culture. Real issues exist. What do we do with the societally deviant: punish them? Treat
them? What difference in the various models? Indeed is not individual responsibility a
myth promulgated by the "establishment," i.e., an economic oligarchy, the church, or the
state? If the individual responsibility was at one time viable what does it mean now? How
do we go about finding a responsible man? And if he were wise (as I suggest he would be)
would he not hide from us to keep the taper flickering for another age, for a critical period
where he could assert personal impact?
What distinguishes a responsible man? Are there positive indicia? Can a criminal be
responsible? If he is, do we punish him and if he is not, do we commit him? What are our
justifications for any or all of our limited models in confronting the societal outlaw, or
deviant threat? A precipitous move toward a revised system obscures but does not start
to answer these questions.
42. See, e.g., Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMB. L.J. 273 (1968). I am happy
to join Kadish. I particularly join in his conclusion and exhortation:
One would hope that the direction of creative reform would not be to remake the
criminal law after the model of these special and largely unsuccessful exceptions to
the fundamental criminal law principles, but rather to devise legal principles and
mechanisms for subjecting the process of treatment and social prevention to the
restraints of law.
Id. at 290.
43. See Morris, supra note 37. Morris, in an appendix to his excellent article, outlines
the key position taken by the advocates of abolition.
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sary position. Keeping the insanity defense maintains, for lawyers
at least, a high level visibility of psychiatric incompetence and
sometimes bad faith-all of which can be easily masked in the re-
vised version. Experts become institutionalized as quickly as mere
mortals. Would there not be a tendency to err against the individ-
ual by an institutionalized psychiatric (or whatever) panel at
phase two of the revised process? The revision of the model in-
volves a theoretical revision of our ideal: to protect the individual
against official intervention. The threat, if not the actuality, looms
large.
Returning to the competing normal and revised versions, I
think it accurate to distill rehabilitation as a central concept. The
rehabilitative ideal is implicit in both versions. In practice, both
will often sacrifice the individual to utility while purportedly re-
ducing the community fear or anxiety generated by crime at the
particular moment. The move should be a tightening up of such
law, a move toward due process machinery. 44
The Wootton position's escalation among commentators
(e.g., Katz is an articulate advocate) is a product of its intellectual
attractiveness first, because it is the natural outcome of the reha-
bilitative ideal,45 and, second, because community pressures are in-
creasingly generating disaffection with the present process. The
general community discontent with the normal process is a func-
tion of a general societal alienation and demand for the law to pro-
vide answers to problems of human living. As such societal
demands are not directed against particular procedures but focus
on a demand for results. A popular and academic theme goes to
this issue of social alienation. I would like to briefly describe this
alienation and show its relation to criminal process: normal or
revised. Neither version resolves alienation, but the revised version
indicates a focus on psychiatric expertise for solution of societal
ills. This focus undercuts an emphasis on what man can do for
himself in the every day world. A psychiatric focus distorts and
obfuscates economic and social problems which must be con-
44. But my prediction would be a behaviorist victory. And the forces which would
engender such a victory ironically come from different ideological positions. A. Szasz, for
example, is joined with a Lady Wootton on the abolition of the insanity defense. Szasz
feels that mental illness is a myth. Lady Wootton, like Katz, wants social scientists to get
into the process more quickly and efficiently.
45. See F. ALLEN, BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1919), for an elucidation of this
concept.
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fronted before we indulge in psychiatric labeling. The present
state of our society suggests the ease with which we can opt out of
individual action by allowing state authorized psychiatrists to pro-
vide answers for us.
Following is intended to be a brief description of at least one
view of our society. The phenomenological level is as important
as the analytic because we must know what is in the world out
there before we can analyze it.
The future seems to many to offer little hope for a continua-
tion of stable patterns passed from generation to generation in a
timebinding nexus.40 Parents do not know what to tell their sons
or daughters to do or to be; parents are increasingly pushed to the
wall in an attempt to justify their own existence. As a highly gen-
eralized abstraction it can be said that we do not have or are rap-
idly losing faith in the future. Our institutions seem to be caught
in a cybernetic program, self sustaining but impermeable to hu-
'man intervention. Citizens are told that they arie the Silent Ma-
jority and are structured to reflect that psychological necrophilic
position. They are told that their values are being destroyed, and
that they are being ignored. They are not encouraged to create oi
keep alive norms; just hate the haters.
Whien a group feels meaninglessness or anxiety, or "both, it is
almost a healthy expectation that it will search for the cause of
this aimlessness. A common enemy mobilizes the group to act in
unity. Nietzsche clearly saw the power of "resentment."47 So did
Scheler and Mannheim.
In this society, the "freaks," "hippies," Yippies, and crimi-
nals are among the groups who are obvious butts of society's re-
sentment. Society observes: "they" are destroying; but "we" are
civilized; we do not want to punish' we want to help; we know
that we are somehow implicated ii-the process that entails: such
deviants. What to do? To treat: a hipy solution. But,:is' this a
viable one? Does it not present dangers in itself?.
This does not mean that there is something inllerently bad
about the rehabilitative ideal implicit in the revised version. The
danger is the discernible tendency to evaluate self, in aflphases of
46. See generally K. KENNISTON, THE UNCOImrTED: ALIENATED YOUTH iN AMERICAN
SOcTY (1965).
47. See BEYOND GOOD AND Evu. at 110-11 (Gateway ed. 1955).
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our daily life, in mental health terms. Ronald Leifer,48 a practic-
ing psychiatrist, writes concerning the growth of the community
psychiatry movement (the rehabilitative ideal and the revised ver-
sion are part of the same process):
Community psychiatry must be considered as a full-fledged member of
the modern quest for community undertaken with the instrument of
state power. The modern state is, of course, the most powerful instru-
ment ever in man's hands for accomplishing good. However, as history
had taught us, the quest for community undertaken by the state is the
greatest enemy of the open society. There are indications that it leads,
in varying degrees, to collectivization rather than to community, to
homogenization rather than to individuation, and to obedience
rather than to freedom and responsibility. As the modern method par
excellence for controlling thought and behavior, psychiatry may well
become the chief instrument of the state to bend the individual to its
needs.49
I do not think that it is "the state" at this point which is
subsuming the individual to its needs. Rather the pressure is from
the society on formal institutions to solve problems that are not
being solved, to provide happiness. Our ideology was one of pro-
cedural opportunity for all, for each man to have a right to make
his own life and to pursue his own happiness. Whatever the theo-
retical causes imputed by Neo-Marxists, sociologists, Neo-
Freudians etc., man in this society does not Seem to feel a powerless-
ness to feed his needs into institutional workings. Most often, the
''average" citizen seems incapable of articulating his disaffection,
his anxiety, his desires. (Psychotherapists know the importance for
the patient of overcoming general "free floating" anxiety, i.e., anx-
iety without a discernible object.)
In some ways, ironically, a society which pretends to want a
cultural pluralism encourages fragmented groups with disparate
loyalties. Erik Erikson, along with ego psychology in general, has
stressed the strength of the individual ego over individual ego
weakness. I think that a balanced picture of this society and its
symbols still reflects the old due process norms. These norms are
becoming vacuous. Statements attributed to our "new breed" of
young reflect the fact that they have internalized the ideals of due
48. R. LEIFER, IN THE NAME OF MENTAL HEALTH: THE SOCIAL FUNCIONS OF PsYcm-
ATRY (1969).
49. Id. at 241-42 (emphasis added).
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process both procedurally and substantively. They want the dis-
tribution of societal goods to all; they are not contented with a
procedurally fair process. Procedure does not put food into peo-
ples' mouths or alter the physical environment of ghettos, or pro-
vide job training and opportunities. These require substantive
legislation.
A criminal process to work in a free society must yield as high
and as visible a quality of justice as possible. It also must protect
the society from the dangerous. Our system is failing but not be-
cause it has ignored the revised version's objective, the rehabilita-
tive ideal; it is moving more and more toward it and will get
increasingly effective at it without need of any behavioral substi-
tuted process.50 The changes we need are substantive. We do not
need a negation of our due process ideals which the abolition of
mens rea may entail.51 Nor will we gain any visibility for justice
or, indeed, effectively reduce corroding alienation by switching to
a behavioral model. Such process will operate in much the same
vacuum in which the normal version now operates unless we make
further inroads into a criminal law theory and remove the danger-
ous before they commit dangerous acts. The enforcement phase
of the normal version receives more publicity and permeates
deeper into group feelings than the trial phase of the normal ver-
sion. Likewise, this will be true of the behavioral phase of the re-
vised version. At least at the beginning the behavioral assessment
process will have very low visibility.
In the next few years we can move into the schools and other
institutions with batteries of sophisticated tests sensitive to the
issue of dangerousness. A recent and exhaustive analysis of the
question of the violent person suggests this very option. 2
At present, neither reliable identification nor successful treatment for
most types of potentially violent individuals can adequately be assured.
There is evidence that part of the problem lies with the current short-
age of facilities and trained personnel to work specifically with the
potentially violent individual. The solution to this problem is more
50. I am not arguing that treatment under present knowledge cannot be effective. 1
do think, however, that it is on the road to being more effective. This presents a hope and
a danger. See P. LONDON, BEAvOR CONTROL (1969).
51. See generally Ellul, Law as Representation of Value, 10 NATURAL L. FORUM 54
(1965).
52. Comment, Contemporary Studies Project: Detection Treatment and Control of the
Potentially Violent Person, 55 IowA L. R.v. 118 (1969).
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complex, however, than a mere reallocation or increase in funds for an
expansion of these services. The successful prevention of violent be-
havior initially requires the advancement of techniques for identifying
potentially violent individuals and for, diagnosing the degree of their
propensities for violence.5 3
A key factor in the increasing concern with the rehabilitative
ideal (in either a normal or revised process) is that rehabilitation
is increasingly becoming viable. But I do not know what rehabili-
tation connotes. It calls for some mode of approved socialization of
the offender. It calls for treatment so as to permit the offender to
become a meaningful member of society. It calls for altering his
attitude concerning his criminal activity so he can see the "light."
All this is part of the psychological implication of rehabilitation,
yet there is certainly an economic perspective-to enable the of-
fender to acquire skills to compete effectively for society's goods,
including prestige.
The time has come to examine the various modes of therapy
within our rehabilitative system and its goals and expected re-
sults.54 For example, if an offender has become emeshed in the
process because of homosexuality, does the society have the right
and/or obligation to "cure him" of his homosexuality or to at-
tempt to socialize him so he will not get caught in homosexual
activity in' the future? But even asking these questions changes our
focus, and such' change is most important. We have already de-
termined that there is something sick about homosexuality if we
decide to treat it. The same point must be made with perhaps
53. Id. at 226. The comment continues:
It is recommended that research for the improvement of these techniques be conducted
on school children and prison inmates, two groups readily accessible for testing pur-
poses. Random samples from these populations would be selected and thoroughly
evaluated. A prediction would then be made regarding each subject's propensity for
violence. Periodically, follow-up studies would be conducted to determine the accu-
racy of the predictions and to locate significant correlations between specific test
indicia and subsequent violent or nonviolent behavior. These results could then be
used to refine identification procedures.
Cf. Yarvis, Potentials for Psychiatric Research into Criminal Behavior and Correctives:
Its Implications for the Prison and the Court, 3 ToL. L. Rlv. 599 (1969), wherein the
author, formerly Chief of Psychiatric Services, Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1967-1969, sug-
gests "that given more data based on etiological studies, psychiatrists can furnish courts
with more complete and specific explanations to account for the Commission of Criminal
Acts. What philosophic, moral, or legal conclusions they wish to draw from such cxplana.
tions must remain their concern." Id. at 631 (emphasis added).
54. The following reflection has been attributed to the noted psychologist David
Bakan: "[T]he reason- why psychologists have not heretofore been effective is that tblcy
really do not want to predict and control human behavior."
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greater force vis-at-vis political types. A Bobby Seale may be dan-
gerous. Should the "treating team" find out why, find out if he is
justified in being "a dangerous threat" or should we socialize him
if possible. If therapy does not work, should we use shock, drugs?
We must clarify our rehabilitative ideal.
Much of my case has been predicated on an assumption of the
alienation of society. It may be that only certain radical youth and
ivory towered academics feel despair, anger, or resolve against "the
system." The rhetoric is loose, the feelings uncertain, hurt, baffled.
But when an articulate "alienated" group, given high level pub.
licity, expresses its discontent, its action in itself can provoke a
reaction of the "unalienated" majority who fear the inflamed rhet-
oric. When a whole system is challenged, it is a natural reaction for
the satisfied (particularly if they are not psychologically secure) to
want to remove the threatening group.
The ideology of due process, of which mens rea is an impor-
tant substantive part, serves as a buffer to the effective operation of
quickly and badly conceived law. The mens rea requirement can
provide an opportunity for the application of principles of justice
which are not part of our positive law but are integral to our sys-
tem of justice 5 The very existence of the mens rea requirement
permits the court (and jury) an opportunity to "interpret" the
legislative proscription. The jurist maintains the dynamic tension
between positive law and natural right 6 The abolition of mens
rea will permit a greater likelihood of application of untempered
legislative enactments corrupting a-final buffer to individual free-
dom. A wise judge with proper tools can often frustrate bad law.
VI.
Would the revised version make a difference in the following
cases: 1) the 1968 Chicago Democratic Convention, 2) the Chi-
cago Conspiracy Trial and 3) the Chicago-based activity of the
Weathermen?
55. See Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CH. L. REv. 14 (1967) wherein Pro-
fessor Dworkin persuasively indicates that we do have principles of justice which are not
part of our positive law, and that analytical positivism as conceived through Austin by
H.L.A. Hart inadequately accounts for such principles.
56. See Kaufman, The Ontology of Natural Law, 8 NATURAL L. FORUM 79 (1963).
Kaufman indicates that the actualization of justice requires natural law principles to
operate, confront and push positive law perceptions.
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It is worthwhile to examine these cases in themselves as well
as in relation to a revised version because they reflect paradigms
which society demands the law to handle in some way. These situ-
ations provide a real context on which any criminal procedure may
have to act.
The three "episodes" are in the continuing flow of our so-
cietal time-space continuum. They cannot be removed and ex-
amined in a vacuum. They are "caused" by societal pressures, and
precondition certain societal responses. It is impossible to do more
than impute etiological theories to their cause; it is impossible to
construct more than heuristic models of explanation. But it is
beneficial to understand that these situations are social, not in-
dividually manifested "abhorrent" activities.
Schur,5 7 commenting on the more general problem of "most
criminal offenders," states:
The belief that most criminal offenders are 'basically different' has
constituted a dangerous form of self-deception. By virtue of it, those
fortunate enough to live relatively law-abiding lives have washed
their hands of all responsibility for crime problems. And the moral self-
righteousness bred through this device frequently strengthens the
grounds of resistance to rational and humane crime policies. Cer-
tainly it is true that some crime reflects the personal problems of the
offender individual, yet ... the applicability of strictly psychiatric
explanations of criminal acts-in terms of the total range of types of
'treatment' and 'rehabilitation'-admittedly commendable ones-must
not serve as comfortable evasions of responsibility for the social nature
of crime. One consequence of the eager resort to this rhetoric has been
the attempt to pass on to psychiatrists and other treatment personnel
responsibility for 'solving' social problems that reach beyond their
professional competence. Another result has been a tendency to ignore
the substantive and procedural rights of the individual; as we proceed
to take whatever action is deemed necessary to protect 'his own in-
terests.'58
The point I want to make concerning all three situations goes to
the fact that all were predictable "happenings"; that they are part
of what is termed our increasing "political polarity." Vietnam,
poverty, race-all gave thrust to these situations; these factors
57. E. SHum, OUR CRIMINAL SoCIETY: THE SociAL AND . ,%L SOURCES OF CRIME IN
AMFRiCA (1969).
58. Id. at 231 (emphasis added).
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seeded the ground of hollowness that the participants, at least,
personally perceived.
The 1968 Convention was well within our tradition with
citizens assembling in large numbers in Chicago to voice protest.
The City geared itself for invasion. Response, counter response;
inevitable confrontation.
How was the criminal process to deal with the protesters?
Arrest fortuitously? Arrest the leaders? Were there leaders? Arrest
no one?
The normal version of the criminal process was not instru-
mented to handle this type of situation.r9 The process is designed
to handle single offenders not masses of citizens who are confront-
ing what they see to be arbitrary governmental or quasi-govern-
mental action. The 1968 Convention defied a just application of
the normal process. The high visibility of events during the con-
vention put the country on notice of the broad spectrum of citi-
zens participating. So one would arrest, find guilty and fine.
Another response, of course, could be to indict the "leaders"-
of the protesters at the Convention; to deflect attention from the
large number of participants to a handful of acknowledged trou-
blemakers. How does one go about picking leaders in a happening
like the 1968 Convention? Why have a trial at all? Is there a choice
or is such a trial "inevitable"?
We have been treated to the spectacle of Hoffman against
Hoffman. This is our normal version at work at its worst. A bad
law, arbitrary selection of defendants (partially due to the bad
law) and a trial which is making a mockery of the dignity of the
American courtroom. Counsel arrested. For what? Contempt of
what? A defendant bound and gagged. We know all this. So what.
Well, at least for those who still care, we do have visibility to this
mockery; we can assess it and comment on it and hopefully change
this type of denigration of process.
The revised version would not alter this situation; the trial
would have to determine if the defendants did enter into a con-
spiracy, but I fear that the trial would be somewhat truncated
without mens rea requirements. In a revised version it would
59. See Fuller, The Law's Precarious Hold on Life, 3 GA. L. REv. 530 (1969). "Events
that take place beyond the reach of ordinary human powers of observation and judgment
are equally beyond the reach of any legal rule that requires us to decide just who was
to blame for what happened." Id. at 536.
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seem to prove that defendants did what they did and did it to-
gether. Would the intention of each defendant to enter a conspir-
acy be relevant in the revised version? Since the statute requires
it, the revised version would have to inquire into intent pending a
reworking of statutory language. °
The Weathermen incident in Chicago is a prime example of
the escalation of rhetoric to symbolic violent action. This is in one
sense the age of McLuhan.0 1 Form (presentation) becomes more
important than content. A group like the Weathermen which
wants to make'an impact on society has to find a way to get pub-
licity for its view. Rhetoric is cheap. All groups have competing
"eloquent" spokesmen. Key words are used, catchingly coined: for
example, "pig" for policeman. But even here with the prolifera-
tion of groups, one may co-opt the vocabulary of another. It be-
comes necessary to maintain individual and group integrity (often
more important than issue analysis or ideology in general). Psy-
chologically, the acting out of violence becomes a natural step to
show a group's disdain for mere talk and its commitment to action.
This serves at least two purposes: to attract any who are tired of
talk and want to join with true activists and to shock society from
the trance previously induced by repeated violent rhetoric. At
some point someone must put up or shut up!
Ironically, the groups who are deriding the establishment are
the groups who demand the full complement of the Packer Due
Process Model. The ideology and action of the Weathermen posits
that the greater the injustice it can show exists, the more support
it will receive from the new generation to whom it is directing its
communications. If in the process Due Process is foreclosed to a
greater degree, the Weathermen expect greater support. If total
repression is the outcome, this only will prove that the seeds of
such repression were already planted. And the liberals will have
to join or be forever silenced. The revolution will be necessary to
protect freedom.
We will not, however, provide more respect for the criminal
process, greater deterrence, or loyalty to the system by obfuscating
or delimiting our Due Process Model vis-4-vis the potential of-
60. See Kadish, supra note 42.
61. See M. McLuHAN, THE MEDutm IS THE MFSSAGE (1967).
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fender.62 I do think that a swifter more deadly law enforcement
system could satisfy the fear of the greater part of the society re-
garding the so-called dangerous. This would entail a conscious al-
teration of our ideology to a Control State which euphemistically
and actually we would and may well make therapeutic.
It bears repeating: labeling the Weathermen, a Convention
Rioter, or a Conspirator sick and in need of treatment which I
think Katz' revised version would do, undercuts their respective
philosophic position and denies to them the opportunity to give
effective voice to their dissent. Who will listen to a madman? We
will all pity him. This does not make it fairer to punish him when
we feel we have engendered or not reacted to the causes of his be-
havior. I think it the better of the competing evils. If treat him we
must, let us safeguard his opportunity to excuse himself at the very
outset.
The revised model, in short, can readily lend itself to a perver-
sion of a fair hearing of issues on the merits and substitute swift
Crime Control procedures augmented by psychiatric labels.
VII.
I intend in this and the following section to develop the two
positions justifying punishment as an institution: retribution and
deterrence. These positions are outlined to show their relevance as
justifying the normal system's use of punishment and to show that
the revised system must likewise account for its justification on
the same arguments. Both retributivists and utilitarians are aware
of and attempt to answer the arguments against the normal version
of punishment.
If we cannot justify our normal version's system of sanction it
does not follow that we can more readily defend a behavioral
model. Justification, however, exists both in the philosophical
sense and on the existential level. We must show that we can gain
societal acceptance of any system no matter how theoretically ideal
it may be. We acknowledge the validity of Professor Ellul's words:
[We are concerned with] the man [who] expresses his failure to ad-
here to this [any] law and thereby testifies to this degree of inapplica-
62. D. MA1rzA, DELINQUENCY ANI> DR=r (1964) has pointed out that the denial of due
process to juvenile offenders in favor of a therapeutic process causes a greater animus by
the "delinquents" against the system than the adversary process. Juvenile offenders appar-
ently have sufficiently internalized our conception of fair play to the point that rehabilita-
tion demands that they get fair play. "I'll pay for what I do but not for what I did not do."
207
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
bility in the law. If his sentiment becomes general, if men have this
representation of their law, that it is unjust, oppressive, unworthy of
confidence, then the law ceases to be really applicable, even if for-
mally and for a time it is applied. A society where the applicability of
law no longer holds is a society in danger. There is a kind of socio-
moral hemorrhage in a group of this order which cannot be indefinitely
maintained on the basis of... a purely formal order.03
Punishment is, and is conceived to be, a form of suffering
imposed on an individual offender for the breach of a legal
ukase.04 H.L.A. Hart drawing on the work of Baier,65 Flew,60
and Benn 67 defines punishment thus:08
(i) It must involve pain or other consequence normally con-
sidered unpleasant.
(ii) It must be for an offense against legal rule.
(iii) It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his
offense.
(iv) It must be intentionally administered by human beings
other than the offender.
(v) It must be imposed and administered by an authority
constituted by a legal system against which the offense is com-
mitted.
Definition is important so we know what we are trying to
justify, since as conditions change former justifications become ir-
relevant or off-mark. However, arbitrary classification of a socie-
tal intervention as being or not being punishment is illegitimate.
Moreover, we have the Wittgensteinian insight that we can only
63. Ellul, supra note 51, at 59.
64. See generally J. MIc-IAr. & H. WECHS.ER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION
4-17 (1940).
65. K. BAIER, IS PUNISHMENT RETRIBUTIVE ANALYSIS? (1955).
66. A. FLEW, THE JUSTIFICATION OF PUNISHMENT PHILOSOPHY (1954).
67. Benn, An Approach to the Problems of Punishment, 33 PHILOSOPHY 325
(1958) in FIFEDOM AND RESPONSMILrTY: RADINGS IN PHILOSOPHY AND LAW 517 (H.
Morris ed. 1961).
68. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 16, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punish-
ment and Responsibility at 4-5. Hart adds secondary definitions:
(a) Punishments for breaches of legal rules injured or administered otherwise than
by officials (decentralized sanctions).
(b) Punishments for breaches of non-legal rules or orders (punishment in a family
or school).
(c) Vicarious or collective punishment of some member of a social group for actions
done by others without the former's authorization, encouragement, control or permission.
(d) Punishment of persons (otherwise than under (c)) who neither are in fact nor
supposed to be offenders.
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make sense of terms in the context in which they are used.69 (We
must know our game and its rules.) Punishment as far as society
is concerned may be play to the moral masochist. Treatment to
society may be punishment to the patient-victim. We must bear
in mind the subjective-objective perspectives in both punishment
and responsibility. 70 Both are necessary to the justification of any
practice which a society institutionalizes. It is allowable to play
with Alice's friends, but we must have some understanding of a
word's referent whatever our Wonderland.
The essence of the retributive position may perhaps be dis-
tilled from Kant: "Whoever commits a crime must be punished in
accordance with his desert. ' 7 1 To Kant:
Juridical punishment can never be administered merely as a means
for promoting another good either with regard to the criminal himself
or to the civil society, but must in all cases be imposed only because
the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a crime. For one
man ought never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the
purpose of another, not mixed up with the subject of real right.
Against such treatment his inborn personality has a right to protect
him even though he may be condemned and punishable before
there can be any thought of drawing from his punishment any benefit
for himself or his fellow-citizens. The penal law is a categorical im-
perative; and woe to him who creeps through the serpent windings of
utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may discharge him from
the justice of punishment, or even from due measure of it, according
to the Parisaic maxim: 'It is better that one man should die than the
whole people should perish . . .' For if justice and righteousness per-
ish, human life would no longer have any value in the world.... But
what is the mode and measure of punishment which public justice
takes as its principle and standard? It is just the principle of equality by
which the pointer of the scale of justice is made to incline no more to
69, L. WrOENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVSTIGATIONS (1958). See generally J. HART-
NACK, WnrTGENSTEIN AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY (1965) which puts the work of H.L.A.
Hart and others in perspective in regard to the Wittgenstein influence.
70. See A. Scurz, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORM (1967).
71. E. PINcOIrs, THE RATIONALE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT 4 (1966). See also H. PACKER,
THE Lnrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCrION (1969); and the work of the philosophers John
Rawls, Joel Feinberg, A.M. Quinton, S.I. Benn, C.W.K. Mandle, J.D. Mabbott, and H.L.A.
Hart. One should particularly acknowledge the work of Professor Jerome Hall whom I
have not cited but whose work has a pervasive influence among modem legal commentators
in the field of jurisprudence, and particularly criminal jurisprudence. I have also pre-
viously cited Herbert Morris's extraordinary collection FREEDom AND RESPONSIBILrrY. The
Morris text also contains a lengthy bibliography of relevant material. I have also been
constantly stimulated by the work of C.S. LEwis, THE ABOLITON OF MAN (1947).
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the one side than the other. It may be rendered by saying that the
undeserved evil which anyone commits on another is to be regarded
as perpetrated on himself. Hence it may be said: 'If you slander an-
other, you slander yourself; if you steal from another, you steal from
yourself; if you strike another, you strike yourself; if you kill another,
you kill yourself.' This is the Right of Retaliation (jus talionis); and
properly understood, it is the only principle which in regulating a
public court as distinguished from mere private judgment, can defi-
nitely assign both the quality and the quantity of a just penalty. All
other standards are wavering and uncertain; and on account of other
considerations involved in them, they contain no principle conform-
able to the sentence of pure and strict justice.72
There has been a renewed modern vitality given to the retribu-
tive cause.73 Pincoffs has distilled the retributive classical position
to these three points:
1. The only acceptable reason for punishing a man is that he
has committed a crime.
2. The only acceptable reason for punishing a man in a given
manner and degree is that the punishment is 'equal' to
the crime.
3. Whoever commits a crime must be punished in accordance
with his desert.7 4
Pincoffs indicates that the position rests on two assumptions: an
assumption about the direction of justification to the criminal;
and an assumption concerning the nature of justification to show
the criminal that it is he who has willed what he now suffers. It is
important to note the a priori nature of the argument: to direct
punishment at an individual offender, him and him alone. The
retributive argument is not primarily concerned with deterrence,
although certainly modern exponents would concede this to be
an element of punishment in practice. Without further explora-
tion, punishment administered as deserved by an offender seems
to lawyers to be a natural law system. 5 Pragmatically, this justi-
72. REcTSLEKRE, Part 2, 49 (E. Hastie transl. 1950) ; reprinted in E. PINcorrs, supra
note 71, at 2, 3.
73. See Mabbott, Punishment, 49 MIND 152 (1939) in JUSTICE AND SOCIAL POLICY 39
F. Olafron ed. (1961); Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 20M GENTURY
(1949); Mundle, Punishment and Desert, IV THE PHILOSOPHICAL Q. 216 (1954) in ETHIcs
430 (. Thompson and G. Dworkin eds. 1968); A. S. KAUFAN, ANTHONY QUINTON ON
PUNISHMENT ANALYSIS (1959).
74. See E. PINCOFFS, supra note 71, ai 15.
75. Id.
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fication delimits and thereby safeguards an offender from anything
more than his "just desert."
But the question of deciding "just desert" is a difficult if not
impossible one. Enemies of the retributive model reduce the prin-
ciple to an absurdity. "You can take a life for a life, but beyond
that there is practically no room for the principle of equation to
operate. You can't impose a rape for a rape, a forgery for a forgery.
An eye for an eye is not impossible, but does .. .anyone . . .
today seriously suggest putting out the eye of a man guilty of hit-
ting another in the eye in a felonious assault?"76 We can, as Profes-
sor Weihofen has indicated, rank offenses but this proves rather
difficult on application. What is a crime intrinsically worth on a
"suffering scale"? Any matching of severity of offense and strictness
of sanction would not lie in the logical sphere but would be an in-
tuitive assessment by decision makers conceiving what they
thought the rank order of serverity to be. Yet such a principle
does provide notice to the offender as to what he can expect; it
treats the offender as an equal and it attempts to guarantee that he
will not get a greater sanction than he deserves.78
That the retributive model is concerned principally with the
offender and not with the deterrent effect on the society is high-
lighted by the following example offered by Mabbott." If an in-
dividual breached a law or rule of an organization and no one but
the sanctioning authority knew of such breach, and if publicity of
such breach could be proscribed, should punishment not be ren-
dered? What if the sanctioning authority thought the breach
justified? What if the sanctioning authority thought the offender
not dangerous? The principles of utility would allow the possi-
bility of no punishment for the breach as long as it remained secret
in the outside community. The retributive would not.
76. Aquinas and Grotius can be added to the historical list supporting a form
of retributive justification; further supporting its "natural law" heritage, see Newman,
Punishment and the Breakdown of the Legal Order: The Experience in East Pakistan,
NoMos III: REsPONsMILrry 128 (C.J. Frederich ed. 1960).
77. Weihofen, Retribution is Obsolete, Noaros III: RESPONSIBILrrY (C.J. Frederich
ed. 1960).
78. Macartney says "To punish a man is to treat him as an equal. To be punished
for an offense against rules is a sane man's right." See Mabbott, supra note 73, at 46.
The word that behaviorists will key on is "sane." We should remember this as yet to be
a legal term of art, presumed until put in issue on trial, (or if we broaden the concept,
part of the competence to stand tried issue).
79. The strength of the argument runs through Mabbott's article; see supra note
73.
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Here Mabbott parts company with the classical retributivists.
To Mabbott, punishment is a "purely legal matter."80 There is
no equation between punishment and the morality of the offender.
A 'criminal' means a man who has broken a law, not a bad man; an
'innocent' man is a man who has not broken the law in connection
with which he is being punished, though he may be a bad man and
have broken other laws.8'
This position separates law and morality. 2 Under this formula-
tion marijuana possession, for example, will not be treated but
punished. (If the law is unjust, punishment of offenders is more
likely to create change in the law than a behavioristic revised
process which designates the offender sick. Once we have decided
that conduct is sick, we will dampen motivation to change such
laws. After all, we must treat sickness.)
The key charge leveled at the retributivist model, one against
which most students of my generation have been directed, is that
retributive punishment is nothing more than vengeance. Some
commentators have argued that one justification for maintaining
punishment, including the capital sanction, is the need to appease
the vengeance desires of the community which demands its pound
of flesh. More subtly the argument continues: punishment in
addition to satisfying vengeance needs, allays any envy the com-
munity may have concerning the possible success of offenders. 3
The retributivist answer to this charge is that retribution is
not seeking vengeance. Society is doing nothing more than paying
the offender his due. He has purchased his punishment. The law
seeks to maintain compliance; it does not structure toward breach.
The community does not want to punish; it does not need to, but
when the offender has acted against its legal machinery it must.
At this juncture the argument takes on a tone of pure legal science
(a Kelsonian positivism): action-reaction; inexorability.
80. See supra note 78, at 41.
81. Id.
82. See H.LA. Hart's excellent formulation, drawing on Durkheim, of issues as
to how much and of what order society can separate moral questions from legal
' Proscriptions. Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, 35 U. C-. L. Rnv. 1
-(1-967).
83. See generally Bodenheimer, Is Punishment Obsolete in Nomos III: RESpONSi-
uTny 87 (C. J. Frederich ed. 1960). See also Ehrenshweig, A Psychoanalysis of the In-
sanity Plea-Clues to the Problem of Criminal Responsibility and Insanity in the Death
Cell, 73 YALE L.J. 425 (1964), for a sophisticated psychoanalytic analysis of the function
of the capital sanction.
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To be a human institution, a practice must reflect human val-
ues such as mercy; it cannot pretend to be the necessary half of a
physical law or mathematical equation. Granted that the individual
offender has "purchased his punishment," it does not follow that
we have a right in our sanctioning practice to meet his wrong with
one of our own. Institutional responsibility is necessarily higher if
we are to preserve respect toward ideals of justice. Opponents of
retribution certainly have a case against a rigid pronunciation of a
tariff sanctioning scale. Justice to be real must be individualized. 4
But this can be done without undermining the very real concern
of the retributivists position on justice. Vengeance does not seem
an inevitable corollary to the retributive justification of punish-
ment. To the extent it is, attack against it and modification of its
theory is necessary.
VIII.
The other philosophical position justifying punishment as
an institution is utilitarianism. The simplistic version of its calcu-
lus is well known: the greatest happiness to the greatest number.
Is this the heart of the utilitarian justification of punishment? Does
it then ignore individuated justice?
William Paley's classic utilitarian position on punishment in-
dicates the direction of justification to the community rather than
the individual. "The proper end of human punishment" accord-
ing to Paley, "is not the satisfaction of justice but the prevention
of crimes. "15 Pincoffs posits the following three Paley propositions
posed to Kantian retribution:
84. See, e.g., Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PxILosopHIcAL Rv. 3 (1955),
ETmics 104 (J. Thompson & G. Dworkin eds. 1968).
85. Quoted in E. PINCOFFS, supra note 71, at 18. Pincoffs further quotes Paley:
[W]hen the care of the public safety is intrusted to men, whose authority over their
fellow creatures is limited by defects of power and knowledge from whose utmost
vigilance and sagacity the greatest offenders often lie hid; whose wisest precautions
and speediest pursuit may be eluded by artifice or concealment; a different necessity,
a new rule of proceeding results from the very imperfection of their faculties.
In their hands the uncertainty of punishment must be compensated by the severity.
The ease with which crimes are committed or concealed, must be counteracted
by additional penalties and increased terrors. The very end for which human govern-
ment is established, requires that its regulations be adapted to the suppression of
crimes. This end, whatever it may do in the plans of infinite wisdom, does not
in the .designation of temporal penalties, always coincide with the proportionate
punishment of guilt.
rd. at 18, 19.
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1) The only acceptable reason for punishing a man is that
punishing him will serve the end of the prevention of crimes.
2) The only acceptable reason for punishing a man in a given
manner and degree is that this is the manner and degree of punish-
ment most likely to prevent crime.
3) Whether or not a man should be punished depends upon
the possibility of preventing the crime in question by non-punitive
means.86
Bentham's version of utilitarianism while a more complete
theory, does not have the pervasive influence in our policy formu-
lation and elucidation that Paley's does. Punishment to Bentham,
as to Paley, is an evil. 7 But, to Bentham, punishment is only one
of the possible modes whereby we can deal with crime.s8 To Ben-
tham, punishment should be inflicted only where it serves to ex-
clude a greater evil. It should not be invoked where it is groundless,
inefficacious, unprofitable or needless. s0
While it is not possible here to give a real analysis to the
richness of the Benthamite elucidation of the punishment prob-
lem, I think it at least necessary to mention the following major
policy principles. Crime should be viewed in its social context,
not on a crime by crime, act by act basis. This significantly reduces
for Bentham the harshness of the Paley formulation. Bentham was
particularly concerned with the use of the legislature for framing
broad policy approaches. As to punishment, his legislative directive
would be to gear the sanction to the rational offender with a view
to minimizing the dangerousness of the offense. Bentham thought
that by differentiating significantly, in the range of sanctions, a
would-be offender would be induced to commit the act which had
a lesser penalty. (The same reasoning, of course, is involved in
providing a greater penalty to crimes where a firearm has been
used.) Though Benthem was concerned with the individuation of
86. See E. PN,4coFrs, supra note 71, at 19.
87. Id.
88. See generally J. BENTHANM. INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION: THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION; AND THE RATIONALE OF PUNISIMIENT (1823).
89. Bentham's alternative modes of dealing with crime include: 1) the Preventative,
2) the Suppressive, 3) the Satisfactory and finally, 4) the Punishment. The first category
would include police presence and warning (a potential offender will not generally
breach when a policeman is on the scene, the argument would go). The suppressive
remedy apparently differs only at the time of intervention from the preventive. The
"satisfactory" category involves reparations and/or indemnities. See E. PINCOFFS, supra
note 71, at 20, 21.
PUNISHMENT
justice, the utilitarian position of balance would still seem (from
the retribution vantage point) slanted to use the individual of-
fender as a deterrent to others. In sanctioning the individual of-
fender, the utilitarian perspective would be in accord with the
revised version's futuristic approach. In fact, the retributivist cry
against the utilitarian position on punishment would permit, if
not indicate, the sanctioning of an innocent man. For example,
given a public scare concerning a series of sexual attacks on women
or children, a utilitarian might countenance (at least his theory
would justify) the sanctioning of an innocent victim so as to allay
the community anxiety.
The utilitarian can answer this charge somewhat by asserting
that the activity would become known, thereby creating a loss of
respect for legal institutions; such a loss would prove negative on
the calculus and thereby proscribe such a practice. The retributive
rejoinder would be that the utilitarian theory still would permit
single acts of punishment of innocent men. (On these terms, this
argument seems irresolvable.) Two contemporary philosophical
papers on the confrontation between the retributive and utilitar-
ian views claim to, and may, resolve this clashY0
John Rawls91 insists on and underlines the distinction "be-
tween justifying a practice and justifying a particular action falling
under it."'9 2 Rawls seeks to explain the distinction by having a
son ask his father, "Why was I put in jail yesterday?" The father
answers, "Because he robbed the bank at B. He was duly tried and
found guilty. That's why [he] was put in jail yesterday." 93 But
continues Rawls, the question could have been "Why do people
put other people in jail?" To which the answer could be "To pro-
tect good people from bad people: or to stop people from doing
things that would make it uneasy for all of us; for otherwise we
wouldn't be able to go to bed at night and sleep in peace.1
94
The first question evidently is directed to an individual case;
the other is directed toward the institutionalized practice. The
90. I will use Rawls, supra note 84, since both he and Quinton, supra note 15,
have indentical positions.
91. See Rawls, supra note 84.
92. Id. at 104. Rawls indicates peripherally that most commentators have accepted
the practice of punishment; few have rejected the practice entirely. It would seem,
however, that if the behavioral (revised) model does eliminate punishment then the
number of advocates entirely against the practice is on the increase.
93. See Rawls, supra note 84, at 106, 107.
94. Id. at 107.
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legislature in the utilitarian scheme is charged with propounding
futuristic policy for the community (the utilitarian perspective).
The judiciary, on the other hand, must apply the prescribed pol-
icy to the individual case, at least partially looking backward
(the retributive perspective). This distinction safeguards the
retributivist objection that the utilitarian practice could allow the
punishment of an innocent man, that is, the retributivist is con-
cerned not with the establishment of an institution to provide a
correspondence between crime and punishment, but with the par-
ticular application. The retributivist is not against maximizing the
greatest benefit to the society as long as the individual is not
sacrificed.
But may not the practice of punishment as promulgated by
the legislature allow for the punishment of the innocent? Prag-
matically, this is errant nonsense in that the high visibility of such
a practice would create anxiety in the citizens who could not be
safe merely because they have not acted in a criminal manner.
Moreover, justice as it is still interpreted, would not allow, as a
broad policy, the purposeful sanctioning of the innocent. With
such visibility what would be gained by punishing the innocent?
Rawls and Quinton 5 agree that punishment as defined pro-
scribes punishment of the innocent. A system of law which allows
the infliction of punishment on an innocent individual as a prac-
tice, Rawls indicates, would not be punishment; it would be some-
thing else which he chooses to call telishment.0 Quinton makes
the same point:
Punishment cannot be inflicted on the innocent; the suffering asso-
dated with punishment may not be inflicted on them, firstly, as brutal
and secondly, if it is represented as punishment, as involving a lie.
'Punishment implies guilt' is the same sort of assertion as 'ought implies
can.' It is not pointless to punish or blame the innocent, as some have
argued for it is often very useful. Rather the very conditions of pun-
ishment and blame do not obtain in these circumstances.07
If we are satisfied with the Rawls-Quinton theoretical solu-
tion of the retribution-utilitarian debate, its effect in practice must
still be considered. To be sure, the legislature posits a practice of
punishment. (We can speculate to what extent it analyzes the
95. See Quinton, supra note 15.
96. See Rawis, supra note 84, at 113.
97. See Quinton, supra note 15, at 515.
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practice on any grounds let alone sophisticated utilitarian ones.)
The legislative act is necessarily futuristic. Our judiciary, however,
does not have a set practice. Herein lies the Katz objection. Theo-
retically, all courts should individuate according to the Rawls
position. But a lack of adequate role definition of jurists, not the
normal system itself, results in a failure to individuate. Our ju-
dicial practice presupposes a finding of guilt. At the dispositional
stage, a jurist generally has a great discretion to be forward look-
ing."' He can often (within maxima and minima) individuate to
a significant extent. It would seem that Rawls is correct in assert-
ing that on the legislative level we can justify a policy only by try-
ing to determine whether it will benefit the society without
creating an evil we particularly wish to proscribe.
The behavioral model, or revised version, seems to be chal-
lenging punishment, to some extent ironically, on retributive
grounds, that is, an individual offender may not be responsible and
therefore should not be subject to punishment. The revised sys-
tem is here, assuming, on the basis of social science data, that of-
fenders should be presumed to have rational control. If offenders
have not acted voluntarily, they should not be held accountable;
they should be held for breach (social utility) if dangerous and
then treated.
On the practice level, the revised model would justify itself
on utilitarian grounds-just like punishment. It would hold of-
fenders for the social good on the practice level. It would take away
their "excuse" opportunity on the dispositional level. Here we
have no suffering as earned. We have an object to be treated: Pro-
fessor Wasserstrom suggests that if it is wrong to punish another
man when he is not "responsible" for his action but merely to de-
ter others, then "this very objection may apply to a greater extent
to a behavioral model." 9 Do we have a right to treat a man if he
98. We know, for example, that many jurists assess an offender who has pleaded
guilty with a lesser sanction, than an offender who has made the process "prove" his
guilt.
99. Wasserstrom, H.L.A. Hart and the Doctrines of Mens Rea and Criminal Re-
sponsibility, 35 U. Ci. L. REv. 92, 120 (1967); Wasserstrom makes many of the same
points I make here, antedating my objectives. He traces Hart's developing views in this
area and contrasts them to Lady Barbara Wootton. He shows, as Hart's writings explicitly
indicate, Hart's partial defection to the behavioral camp. Wasserstrom concludes:
The elimination of responsibility may render unintelligible much that we now
properly seek to proscribe and it may render impotent much that we now use
to prevent the occurrence of crime. But more important, surely, is Hart's insistence
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does not want to be treated? Only if we assume his lack of capacity.
We have traditionally "excused" infants while holding them as
"delinquents"; now we will "excuse" all (if we adopt the revised
model); we will hold and treat the majority of them. Maybe we
should at least give the offender an option to "spontaneously re-
mit" on his own without outside medical intervention while he
serves his term.
Yet, even if we are determined, we still may be the true au-
thor of our acts. A pre-determined act can be intentional and voli-
tional. Determinism implies causes for our actions. This does not
negate our ability to determine and deliberate on these causes.
Feinberg summarizes his argument against a behavioral
model:
I conclude then that the justification of legal punishment as a general
practice is to be found in the benefits it yields directly or indirectly not
just for a specially privileged group, but by and large, for all of us
equally; and that the theory of determinism is no real threat to it.
Determinism is not incompatible with self-righteous anger, hatred, and
cruelty toward the criminal. But then, self-righteousness, hatred, and
cruelty are equally incompatible with indeterminism or any other
theory. In a state of civilized society, I think it safe to say, those attri-
butes and emotions are obsolete.100
This is not to say that confluence of societal forces cannot
victimize more than others. It does say that institutionalized prac-
tice which threatens to infringe on an individual's liberty should
treat him as an equal with all others in the society as they conceive
themselves to be, that is, with intentions and volitions. Even with
the mens rea requirements, the psychiatric experts will get the
offender under our present practice soon enough.
Ix.
Responsibility is the conceptual product of a society wrestling
with normlessness.101
One could easily develop a lengthy epistemological delinea-
tion of the concept of responsibility. I intend here only a
upon our being made aware of the fact that a society which insisted upon treating
all of its offenders would run the very great risk of being stiflingly and insensitively
manipulative.
Id. at 126 (emphasis added).
100. See Feinberg, supra note 19, at 166, 167.
101. WmBsr 's NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICrIONARY UNABRIDGED 1543 (2d ed.
1969).
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brief outline drawing primarily on Richard McKeon's valuable
work. 102 According to McKeon, John Stuart Mill equated the
concept of .responsibility with punishment. Both Bradley and
Levy-Bruhl demurred; the former indicating that Mill's formula-
tion was "vulgar," that is, common usage; the latter insisting that
punishment was not the fundamental import of the doctrine.
McKeon was unable to find a philosophical treatment of re-
sponsibility prior to. 1859. Moreover, such treatment presumed
controversies in which the term "responsibility" did not ap-
pear: 0 3 rather "accountability" was used for which Mill iubsti-
tuted "responsibility."
The Greeks did discourse on imputation and the problems of
accountability in terms of justice. For the Greeks, Aristotle makes
dear, justice had a moral quality pertaining to actions and men:
In moral applications to actions, 'justice' is an ambiguous, term; it
means the 'lawful' and then it is complete virtue in relation to our
neighbor, and it means the 'fair,' and then it is a particular virtue
which takes' two forms: distributive justice, which operates by impu-
tation through honors, money, and other rewards, and rectificatory or
commutative justice, which judges accountability for voluntary and
involuntary damages and injuries.10 4
Justice for the Greeks related ethics to politics. "Imputation"
and "accountability" are subsumed under "justice"; imputation
circumscribes the range of actions open to moral and political
sanction; accountability or guilt served the same function for legal
penalty. 0 5 This distinction is contingent on a "natural" concept
of justice which can be identified by reason. 06 Where justice is
conventional, it is marked by consensus, contract, and power; by
102. McKeon, The Development and the Significance of the Concept of Respon-
sibility, 11 Rlv. INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE 3 (1957).
103. Id. at 5. The word appeared earlier in non-philosophic treatment antedating
philosophic usage by about seventy years. Id. at 6.
104. Id. at 11.
There is therefore [McKeon goes on] a scale of wrong-doing in accountability for
injuries: (1) when the injury occurs contrary to reasonable expectations it is a
misadventure; (2) when it is not contrary to reasonable expectation, but results
from external accident rather than a vice of the agent, it is a mistake; (3) when
the agent acts with knowledge, but not after deliberation, as when he acts in
anger, it is an act of injustice; (4) when he acts from choice he is an unjust and
a vicious man.
Id.
105. Id. at 10-11.
106. See generally L. STRAuss, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953), for an elucida-
tion and particularly close analysis of the concept of national right.
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praise and blame on its positive side; by punishment and other
sanctions on the negative.0 7
The concept of duty as opposed to responsibility more readily
fits into the classical mode. Duty signified "that for which, when
done, a reasonable defense can be adduced." Duty presupposes a
discernible cosmic harmony. By the seventeenth century there was
a diversified effort to posit a science of law and morals analogous
to the physical sciences. The theory, predicated on physical laws,
defined "moral good and evil by . . . [the terms] reward and
punishment and identified by praise and blame."'1 8 The other
mode of explanation posited "free" human actions dependent on
will and intellect; here then "the external accountability imposed
by power or judged by pragmatic utility must be judged by an
internal law recognized by conscience and reason."'100
Mill first used the term responsibility to break the deadlock
concerning freedom and necessity, intentions, motives, etc., all of
which were aimed at finding ethical criteria in terms of reason or
duty. Responsibility in this context is tied to the concept of pun-
ishment, to the fact that we deserve the infliction of punish-
ment.- 0 Mill's position is predicated upon the psychological and
sociological assumption that society does posit rights and wrongs;
that society will disapprove of anyone who pursues the wrong and
will stop such pursuit when it becomes sufficiently serious
(dangerous?).
He [the offender] not only forfeits the pleasure of their [society's]
good will, and the benefit of their good offices, except when compas-
sion for the human being is stronger than distaste towards the wrong-
doer; but he also renders himself liable to whatever they may think
necessary to do in order to protect themselves against him; which may
probably include punishment, as such, and will certainly involve
much that is equivalent in its operation on himself. In this way he is
certain to be made accountable, at least to his fellow-creatures, through
the normal action of their natural sentiments. And it is well worth
consideration, whether the practical expection of being thus called to
account, has not a great deal to do with the internal feeling of being
107. See McKeon, supra note 102, at 12.
108. Id. at 14.
109. Id. at 15.
110. Id. at 19-21.
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accountable; a feeling, assuredly, which is seldom found existing in
no great strength in the absence of that practical expectation.'
Mill's appeal, as would be expected, fits within the classic
utilitarian defense of punishment; society decides (in some way)
right and wrong; the individual internalizes these norms, (posi-
tively) respecting them; the individual is supported in compliance
by the threat of punishment, a seeming corollary to the breach of
a proscription (retribution). Responsibility here assumes merely
that gociety has decided to hold offenders accountable; it assumes
volitions on the practice level. All citizens can internalize societal
norms.
Levy-Bruhl indicated the subjective content of the concept of
responsibility as another and additional implication to the objec-
tive "legal" position of Mill."2 Moral responsibility to Levy-
Bruhl is subjective and "empty of concrete content.""' 3
Responsibility for both Mill and Levy-Bruhl centers in the social
context. The development of the concept did not solve the issues
of freedom, intentionality, rationality, right, and wrong. But the
concept does indicate the social origin of these issues.
But the idea of "responsibility" was applied to governments
before its pronunciation of individual ethical levels. McKeon sug-
gests the following interrelationship:
The original elements of the idea of responsibility depended on a
reciprocal relation of individual and state, but they were negative and
external: a man is responsible under law if he is accountable for the
consequences of his action, and he can be responsible only if the law
is not subject to arbitrary change or enforcement; officials are respon-
sible to rulers or to citizens, and a citizen is responsible if he possesses
the political means of influencing the policies of government."14
Certain assumptions keep a check on the injustices of laws
and the perversity of the constituency: the people shall judge;
justice will flourish in an atmosphere of free moral choice as a
product of rational dialogue. This second assumption attempts to
guarantee an open system, a continued process as opposed to au-
thorative prior directives. But "political responsibility" is contin-
111. J.S. MILL, AN EXAMINATION OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILosoPHy 289
(1884), as quoted in McKeon, supra note 102, at 21.
112. See generally L. LvY-BRUHL, L'IDLE DE RESPON,\BILrii (1884).
113. See McKeon, supra note 102, at 21.
114. Id. at 24.
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gent in turn on cultural or social responsibility, which requires
the recognition of accountability for projects undertaken and im-
putability for actions.
Responsibility on the political-cultural level connotes reflex-
ivity of relationship. 115 This was (and at least verbally still is) a
significant aspect of our democratic ideology. It seems, however,
that the social interaction of contemporary American society has,
on the one hand, conditioned what Riesman calls the "other-di-
rected" man.1 6 On the other hand, it has created the alienated
groups who find little vitality on the individual level in societal
institutions, to sustain a richness and meaningfulness of life.117
McKeon seems to suggest that "responsibility" provides a signifi-
cant conceptual approach to the problems of alienation and repres-
sion (repressions at least on the psychological level)."1
Legal responsibility has focused on the individual thereby
emphasizing such issues as intent, and volition, compulsion and
control. Aristotle posits a "defeasible" definition of volition which
Hart1 9 has used in delineating a modern approach to responsi-
bility.120 In this view it is impossible to indicate all the factors
which must be included to define the responsible act. Rather, the
approach is negative. Voluntary and involuntary are words of art
designating classes of action: if certain excuses exist which are
recognized by society then the individual is not responsible, or
here, if certain "happenings" have occured, the individual has not
acted voluntarily. Such "excuses" and "happenings" seem to be
115. Id. at 26.
116. See D. RIEsMAN, TiH LONELY CROWD (1952).
117. See H. MARCuSE, THE ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN (1964), for a powerful descrip.
tion of the plight of the alienated in this society. One need not buy his under-lying
"casual" explanation to grant him his effective portrait of American life for so many,
118. See -McKeon, supra note 102, at 31. McKeon concludes:
The dilemna of right and good, of custom and duty, grows out of the need for
criteria of values, which is expressed in antagonistic terms borrowed from the
authority which they should possess and the rationality which they should embody;
can the analysis of responsibility increase the reliance on reason that would re-
establish the relation between actual preferences and ideal values? The concept
of responsibility leads away from the ancient logomachies of freedom versus
necessity and of consequences and utilities versus intentions and intuitions to such
problems as these found in the circumstances and history in which the concept itself
was formed.
Id. at 29, 30.
119. H.L.A. HART, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, XLIX 'Ro-
CFEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SocIETY (1948-49).
120. See generally H. VEATCH, RATIONAL MAN; A MODERN INTERIRETATION or ARis-
TOTELIAN ETHICS (1962); B. GARDNER, MORAL RESrONSIfILrrY: A MODERN ARISTOTELIAN
ANALY I ss (1965).
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predicated on the social, normative expectations. For Aristotle
volition and deliberation were necessary to lead the virtuous life.
The aim was to find and learn from the good man (whose charac-
teristics were to be learned): no formula for becoming the good
man seems indicated. Standards, we reflect at this historical state,
were "naturally" posited and apparently accepted on broad based
levels. Man could perform good acts; could deliberate (use reason)
to make appropriate (good) choices.
The modern concept of responsibility dealing in an age of
cultural relativism and competing ideology reflects a concern for
the exercise of personal judgment and a conscious value analysis.
We have not to this extent surpassed Aristotle: the emphasis
on the individual level must still be on reflection and delibera-
tion.121
The modern formulation of legal accountability has focused
on the voluntary character of actions. The formula is simple: we
cannot punish a man unless he acted in a voluntary manner. In
fact, however, we often hold a man for his status. Human behavior
falls on a continuum of consciousness. Many of us find ourselves
driving our automobiles in an unconscious, habituated fashion. If
we were involved in an accident while so "automatically" acting
would we claim that our action was "involuntary ?"122 We cer-
tainly were driving and "intended to drive, and we were willingly
carrying out our intent." We did not, of course, mean to have an
accident and we plead negligence but not intentional smash-up.
However, we would be held accountable, that is, responsible under
present tort law. Likewise, in the criminal process were an indi-
vidual to plan to kill his brother by poisoning his food and if he
took his mother and put her on a train but she came back and ate
this food, would we say that he was accountable?123 Certainly our
protagonist deliberated, did not intend to kill his mother; in fact
he did everything he could to avoid doing so. Yet, we would hold
this individual criminally accountable for the killing. Given the
behaviorist attack on mens rea, I press the point that volition is
not one psychological or static set, but encompasses; in normal
version criminal jurisprudence, a broad range of consciousness. It
121. Pennock, The Problem of Responsibility, Nomos III: RESPONSIBILITY 3,
27 (C.J. Frederich ed. 1960).
122. See J. SILBER, 3EING AND DOING: A STUDY OF STATUS RESPONSIBILITY.
123. Id. at 76.
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is the rare case where an individual has totally and thoroughly
deliberated on his mode of activity.
To adequately analyze responsibility we would have to follow
the McKeon lead: we would have to posit or describe the workings
of an individual's mind, the operation of self, intention and voli-
tion, and we would have to explore the dynamic interchange be-
tween the self and the society in which it is interacting. Such an
analysis is an essential framework for considering responsibility,
one which I will undertake on another occasion.
It is vital to note the "social" influence on self.124 In fact,
modern social science's interpretation of disparate data suggests
that modern man is conditioned by his societal environment.
"Self actualization" theorists, like Carl Rogers, posit the influence
of inadequate personal environment as determining the "natural"
development of the self toward its unique potentiality.12 Even
"existentialism," perhaps the most radical formulation (descrip-
tion) of freedom and responsibility, assumes the social contin-
gency of the self. 2 But it does not follow that societal pressures
absolve an individual from personal responsibility. Rather, we see
the doctrine of responsibility predicated upon our "culture rela-
tivist" state.
The Freudian ethic, for example, does not vitiate responsi-
bility, but demands a personal commitment to an analysis of even
124. See, e.g., G.H. MEAD, MIND, SELF AND SOCIETY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A
SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST (1934).
125. See Rogers, Actualizing Tendency in Relation to Motives and to Consciousness,
in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION (M. R. Jones ed. 1963). See also K. GOLDSTEIN,
HUMAN NATURE IN THE LIGr OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY (1940) and A. MASLOW, TOWAIR A
PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING (1962) for two other significant modem dilineations of self-
actualizing. See generally S. MADDI, PERSONALITY THEORIES: A CO.MiPARATIVE ANALYSIS
(1968).
126. See particularly J.-P. SARTRE, CRIrIQuE DE L'. RAISON DIALECTnQUE (1960); W.
LuuPIN, PHENOMENOLOGY OF NATURAL LAW (1967), puts this Sartrian analysis into a
jurisprudential framework. Sartre, in this critique, has modified his position on the
inexorable conflict between man and man. The Sartre of BEING AND NOTHINGNESS (1943),
in his analysis of the "stare," indicated the only option in human inter-relationship is an
objectifying of the other before he "refies" you. In the Critique, Sartre allows for the
possibility in some future without the necessity of violence and human reification. The
key to this analysis rests with the issue of scarcity; to Sartre human violence is the
inevitable result of a scarcity of societal goods. However, as Professor McBride indicates,
scarcity is always a relative concept and Sartre does not give us an index to determine
when we are approaching a non-scarce state, if this is indeed possible. McBride, Sarire and
the Phenomenology of Social Violence in NEw ESSAYS IN PHENOMENOLOGY 298 (J. Edie
ed. 1969).
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"unconscious" motivation.12 Psychoanalysis does not remove
guilt until it removes the wishes and actions which have engen-
dered such guilt.12 The psychoanalytic rubric where "id is ego
shall be" is a mandate to "know yourself"; psychoanalytic theory
and therapy indicates this possibility. But the ethic is a hard one.
It involves not freedom but an inevitable compromise with soci-
etal norms which are necessary to delimit the dangerous id im-
pulses. Moreover, the ethic demands an internal perspective,
which, although sound on both therapeutic and philosophic
grounds, often undermines attacks against inhuman societal in-
stitutions. Man, according to Freud, is responsible for all the hid-
den, foul urges in society.
This responsibility is harsh and necessary if man is to func-
tion with individual dignity. Mannheim asserts:
['I] he world of social relations is no longer inscrutable or in the lap
of fate but, on the contrary, some social interrelations are potentially
predictable. At this point the ethical principle of responsibility begins
to dawn. Its chief imperatives are, first, that action should not only
be in accord with the dictates of conscience, but should take into con-
sideration the possible consequences of the action in so far as they are
calculable and second, 'that conscience itself should be subjected to
critical self-examination in order to eliminate all the blindly and com-
pulsively operating factors." 29
The concept calls for man to be self reliant; to understand that he
cannot know the right or any right answers; that, in fact, he must
depend upon self for legitimating his own action. To the extent
that we convince ourselves as a society that we are diseased, we may
undermine the power and will for meaningful action. I see the
revised system suggestion as another indication of the diminution
of personal responsibility buttresses to "knowing" behavioral
scientists.
X.
The revised version does correspond with one philosophically
held position on responsibility. As Sartre points out, an individual
127. See P. RiEFF, FREUD: THE MIND OF THE MORALIST (1959). I have indicated
that the sociological implication of Freud's teaching has "caused" him greater feelings
of powerlessness than the pre-Freudian sociology. See also Kaplan, Civil Commitment
"As You Like It", 49 B.U.L REv. 14 (1969).
128. See H. FINGERETrE, THE SELF IN TRANSFORMATION (1963).
129. K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA: AN INTRODUcTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF
KNOWLEDGE passim (1936).
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is necessarily responsible for all his actions. He cannot avoid that
which pervades his consciousness. He may repress it, but psycho-
analytid case studies reveal the types of personal pain which flow
from such repression. Sartre's procedure follows the phenomeno-
logical school of philosophy. Accordingly, he refuses to reduce
human experience to universal causes or instincts. Rather, he at-
tempts to explore existence in its individual and personal rich-
ness. Here, responsibility implies a description of the nature of
individual being; it is an ontologically founded perspective. 8 '
In Sartre's words:
We are taking the word 'responsibility' in its ordinary sense as 'con-
sciousness (of) being the incontestable author of an event or an ob-
ject.' In this sense the responsibility of the for-itself is overwhelming
since he is the one by whom it happens that there is a world; since
he is also the one who makes himself be, then whatever may be the
situation in which he finds himself, the for-itself must wholly assume
this situation with its peculiar coefficient of adversity, even though it
be insupportable .... It is . . . senseless to think of complaining
since nothing foreign has decided what we feel, what we live, or what
we are.18 1
To Sartre then, a war which impinges on my consciousness
is my war and I must respond to it. One could desert or commit
suicide but the choice always lies with the individual; he cannot
avoid it. This may seem unfair, but unfairness is irrelevant. Man
is born into a world not of his choice, but everything he perceives
in it he must react to live authentically, that is, he must live as a
man with the dignity of a man. 3 2 Non-action itself is a choice
which implicates a man's being.
Abolition of mens rea could be held to strengthen our no-
tions of moral responsibility. We will brook no excuses. Commit
a breach of a legal directive and you are responsible. We are play-
180. See generally J. WID, THE CHALLENGE OF EXISTENTIALISM (1966).
131. See J.-P. SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS: AN ESSAY ON PIIENOMENOLOGICaL
ONrOLOov 529-30 (1956).
132. For an evaluation of the relevance of existential philosophy to law, see Black-
shield, The Importance of Being: Some Reflections on Existentialism in Relation to Law,
10 J. OF NAT. L. 67 (1965), wherein the author particularly analyzes the difficult con-
cept of authenticity, which he shows varies according to existential thinkers. This
would follow because authenticity is a necessary product of the personal choice wherein
self continues to constitute self. The concept is subject to errant subjectivism. To this
end it is often pointed out that Heidegger, from whom Sartre took so much, cooperated
fully with the Nazis during world War H.
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ing no excuse games here. No labels of sickness or incom:petency.
But there are differences between legal practices and moral de-
mands. Responsibility is a legal-type term and its moral use is an
analogue to legal-type practice.183 When we say we blame, in the
non-legal context, we mean we censure, or we mean we are advising
someone concerning someone else's being; a suggestion 'to act ac-
cordingly. "He is not responsible" means "do not deal or depend
on him.".
The ontological analysis is suggestive of ethical formulations,
but ethical formulations do not flow full-bodied from an analysis
such as Sartre's. Indicating that a war is my war tells me that I will
respond to it somehow; it does not tell me how to respond. More-
over, Sartre would suggest that this direction can only come, from
my being. I make my values and only I can act on them.
Criminal institutions cannot demand ontological perfection
posited in a philosophic paradigm. Legal practices must provide
some certainty and must allow some human fallibility before
charging accountability. Philosophies from Aristotle to Jaspers
have recognized that the individual will often find himself in an
untenable choice situation. 4 The pressure of legally mandated
absolute responsibility for all acts despite protestations, for ex-
ample of mistake, or duress, could provide an unfair psychological
burden on the average citizen who does comply with, and intends
to comply with, social and legal norms.
A good case can be further delineated calling on psychoanaly-
sis, existentialism, and social psychology since we are respon-
sible for our actions (connoting the making of meaning as opposed
to physiological reflex). The therapeutic idea of the revised version
is at its heart a most demanding ethical stance. But sociologically,
the labeling process which we have incorporated in its operation
serves to sap responsibility values. Instead of indicating that the
individual suffers pain or feels constrained or compelled to act in
a certain mode as a function of his interpersonal relations, we
choose to posit a medical model. Here we claim that we can excise
a cause and make the individual well just as we can give him a
super drug and cure an organically induced disease. Insight thera-
pies seek to make him find his responsibility, and emotionally un-
133. Feinberg, On Being "Morally Speaking a Murderer", 61 J. oF PHILOS.
158 (1964):
134. See Austin, A Plea for Excuses, LVIII ARISTOTFLIAN SOC. PROC. 1 (1956).
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derstand his responses. Insight therapies implicitly posit the
"freedom of the individual to change," "constitute" or "discover"
his own best mode of, and for, being.' 35 As such they posit in-
terpersonal interaction and societal contigency.
We may have the kind of freedom claimed by phenomeno-
logical philosophy: we perhaps can wrench ourselves out of one
social context by a self reflexive act and opt for a different life
style, a more "authentic" mode of being (open, honest, feeling).
But we will probably exist in the styles we have already chosen.2 0
In the words of Professor Gendlin, an existential philosopher-
psychologist:
It is time to emphasize that freedom for me cannot be anything I
please. I have tried it; it does not work. I am not able to be anything
I please, I cannot live in another culture. I cannot have another past.
I cannot be a different person than the one I am. I can only start
with me, with what I am, with what I feel. I must attempt to live
that 'forward' and, with all that, seek a step of felt truth. Then I must
be pleased if my next step is not completely the same as always, if I
succeed, even a little, in obtaining a new, fresh and different way that
actually works for me. To work for me, it must be continuous with my
feelings and it must carry them further. When it occurs it is a felt con-
tinuity, a moving continuity, it means that what I am feeling is resolved
in the actions I devise and choose or in the words I say.137
Mens rea allows for human fallibility and theoretically struc-
tures a developing social sense of what legal responsibility should
be. The revised version undermines this structuring process not
because of its denial of responsibility (we have seen that it is
ontologically justified and more radical than our present ethical-
legal accountability practice), but because it does not allow an
individual to explain his actions. By holding him strictly liable,
the revised version thwarts the feeling of responsiblity which we
seek to engender on the part of the offender. Moreover, the re-
vised version may contribute to a structuring against excuses, thus
encouraging strict moral accountability (impossible in daily hu-
man action). Responsibility rather should reflect a dialectical in-
terchange and a flexibility of response and censure.
135. See Gendlin, A Theory of Personality Change, PERSONALITY CHAN G 102 (P.
Worchel & D. Byrne eds. 1964).
126. See M. M.RL.Au-PorY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERcEP'MON (1962).
137. Gendlin, Neurosis and Human Nature in -the Experimental Method of Thought




My attack is not against a therapeutic ideal but against a ther-
apeutic state.
The revised version, even if it incorporates a full but informal
system of excuses at the second stage of process, moves us further in
the hands of our therapeutic decision-makers who are as societally
conditioned as are we; who have the same value ranges as do we;
who have no peculiar claim to posit a hierarchy of value directions
for the society at large.
The move toward a therapeutic state is a move toward a so-
cial solidarity predicted by Hegel as the apotheosis of historical
human consciousness. The state shall be universal; all citizens shall
be loyal to and content in it, and history will so end. We need ten-
sion to develop human forms to improve or actualize human po-
tential and human institutions.
In a democracy we have opted to allow the individual to
change only because he is persuaded he should change, that change
is in his self interest. The rhetoric of the new left berates our mid-
dle-class consciousness as incapable of furthering more human,
more feeling ideals, institutions, interactions. Our criminal process
as it moves to protect our silent majority for these rumblings and
from its frustrated violence should not permit that the rectitude in
its dissent should be mashed in therapeutic nosological categories.
Sartre posits the ethical justifications for violence to effectuate
individual freedom and to alter human consciousness. His, as well
as Marcuse's position, is a cogently reasoned analysis and vindica-
tion of violent tactics. Ironically, to maintain a community after a
successful revolution, Sartre calls for the giving up of authority to
the community to guarantee the maintenance of group loyalty and
solidarity. To the extent we undercut the already weakened norms
encompassed in mens rea formulation, to the extent we permit our-
selves to help others as patients and not treat others on the issue
level, we will move most certainly to a homogeneous society.
From the Universal Tyrant, however, there is no escape. Thanks to
the conquest of nature and to the completely unabashed substitution
of suspicion and terror for law, the Universal and Final Tyrant has at
his disposal practically unlimited means for ferreting out, and for ex-
tinguishing, the most modest efforts in the direction of thought . . .
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[the coming of the universal and homogeneous state will be the end of
philosophy on earth.]138
Those who are committed to law as a necessary evil, or a
good, cannot allow our legal due process to corrode because our
substantive justice is failing. Better individual anarchy and terror
than soporific drug induced or therapeutically induced vegetative
existence. Our sense of justice runs deeply; our due process can
stand much societal shock before it has to succumb to therapeutic
democracy. Let's keep lawyers (and philosophers) in the process
as long as possible.
138. L STRAusS, ON TYRANNY 226 (1963).
